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ABSTRACT
The Manila Treaty of
history of Southeast Asia.

1954

was a unique event in the

It provided for the creation

of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization, the
first joint alliance between Western powers and the newly
independent nations of this regiono

These nations were the

United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and France.

The

problem was first to determine the reasons for the creation
of such an alliance.

There had been no plans for collective

action since the dissolution of the old imperial defense
systems following World War II.

With the removal of colonial

administrations during the early postwar period, a "power
vacuum" resulted which found millions of Asians in small,
unstable states having little means of self defense and
unprepared to act collectively against massive threats to
their integrity.

The rise of a militant Communist China in

the north prompted active concern for the security of these
small nations.

The Western powers themselves were anxious

to retain the old prewar Open Door doctrines in this area
and took steps to join with the nations of Southeast Asia in
this comm0n interest.

The defeat of the French at Dien Bien

Phu by the Communist Viet•minh created an atmosphere of
urgency

a~d

resulted in immediate agreement for a mutual col-

lective defense.

The primary purpose of the resulting Manila

iii
Treaty was to protect the nations of Southeast Asia against
possible Communist aggression or subversion and to stabilize
the areas facing a hostile Communist China, particularly in
the Indo-China region.

This feature of the Treaty was

expected to provide the states of Indo-China an additional
guarantee of security against violation of the Geneva Agreement if they requested such protection.
The next portion of the problem was to analyze the
various positions taken against this means of collective
security by the individual states which declined to join the
compact.

A review of the political and nationalist re-

actions of the neutral and Communist countries most closely
concerned has helped to determine the source and nature of
the widespread hostility to the Treaty.

Next it was

necessary to analyze the Treaty provisions and the organization, and then weigh SEATO•s effectiveness against the
series of political and military crises that have occurred
in the Treaty area since 1954.
Location of the available materials used in this
study constituted no problem, for most of the essential
research had to be drawn from sources published by the
governments involved.

There has not been sufficient lapse

of time for secret and private documents to have become
available, so no final conclusions-•no definitive history-can yet be written.

iv
The decade since the creation of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Organization has witnessed some challenges
to the peace and security of this Asian area, but none has
been considered of sufficient magnitude to call for the
concerted military reaction of the Treaty organizationo
Although the insurgency now taking place in South Vietnam
might be interpreted to be a potential threat to the Treaty
region, SEATO has carefully avoided precipitous action and
entanglement in this problem because of the internal
political implications of the uprising.

The organization's

military domination by the Western powers has had some
alienating effect on many Asians still sensitive to possible
revival of colonialism in any form.

Therefore, a broader

base of Asian support and participation, with a corresponding
dimunition of the Western role might strengthen the political
effectiveness of the alliance.

However, this study indicates

that SEATO deserves credit for moderating, at least for a
pe~iod,

relations between rival states in the area, and

continues to play an important role in the political stability
of Southeast Asiao
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I
INTRODUC~ION

Since the signing of the Manila Treaty in

1954

and

the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization soon
afterwards, sufficient time has passed to review with some
confidence the events which led to the creation of this
defense pact and its history.

Hot onl1 could the passing

of ten 1ears test the durability of such a treat1 1 but it
could measure, as well, its versatilit1 in meeting the constantly changing political challenges of this evolving
Asian area.
The primary purpose of the Manila Treaty was to
strengthen the nations of Southeast Asia against possible
aggression or internal subversion and to stabilize politi•
call7 the areas facing a hostile Communist China, partieularil7 in the Indo-China region.

Aside from economic and

political objectives, the main plll"pose of the Treaty was to
provide collective military defense for the signatory powers
and for certain designated states that might request military
assistance in case ot attack.

This feature of the Treaty was

to provide the tree states of Indo-China, Laos, Cambodia, and diVided Vietnam an additional guarantee against any violations

ot the Geneva accord.

All the signatory powers were com"

mitted to defense plans which coula involve each 0£ them in

2

military action in event of ''aggression by means

or

armed

attack in the Treaty area," or in the prevention or
nsubversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability."

Obviously

then, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA.TO) is
very I11Uch concerned with the continuing crises in South
Vietnam and Laos, although neither situation has yet
provoked the full concerted action of the Treaty powers.
The Manila Treaty was not well received by some
nations.

The hostility of the Peoples Republic of China

and the Soviet Union was expected, but the non-alignment
and neutrality ot some ot the most vulnerable Southeast
Asia states was a surprise and has not been easily understood.

The Treaty marked the culmination of a long series

or political and military events which prompted some or
the new, independent nations of this area to seek security
through a pattern or collective defense.
similar

de~~n~e i stsuems

There had been no

established in the Treaty area since

the dissolution of the old colonial systems of defense
following World War II.

The United States and other powers

which had pre-war histories in these regions began talks
during the Korean War which resulted in negotiation of the
Manila Treaty in

1954.

This joined Western and Eastern

states in the mutual defense ot an Asian region.
recognized by all the parties to the pact that the

It was
deten~e

4
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA.TO) with
headquarters at Bangkok, was created by the Treaty members
to implement the provisions 0£ the Manila Treaty--economic.
cultural. political, and military.

This organization has

grown considerably since its inception in

1955

and continues

to play an important role in the policies 0£ the Treaty
'

nations, and in the Southeast Asian area in general.

II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A very important political development of the late
nineteenth century was- the rapid domination and even the
colonial partition of the Far East by European powers.

The

penetration of Southeast A.s ia began as early as the sixteenth
century and took various forms, depending on the intent and
objectives of the colonial powers.

The early Portuguese and

Spanish settlements in Malaya and the Philippines placed
strong emphasis on Christian conversions.

The Dutch

settlements in the Malacca straits and the Moluccas were
prompted by commercial interests, while British and French
colonial development, in addition to this econ.omic interest,
attached great importance to political and strategic
control of key areas as a source of power in an age of
expanding national rivalries.
This scramble for colonies in Asia reflected Europe's
smoldering international competition for markets and
materials and extended the European balance of power doc•
trine to the Far East.

The acquisition of the Philippines

by the United States in 1898 as a result of the
Spanish•American War added a new power element in the
Pacific and at the same time enmeshed this country in the
European scheme of power balance.

Japan, however, was not

immediately involved in this colonial pattern.

But when

6
China challenged the independent status or Korea, the
disastrous war with Japan which followed in 189~ gave
Japanese ambitions in Manchuria and China an earl1 foothold.
Baropean reaction to this development was swift and led to
Russian seizure or Japanese•held Port Arthlll' and German
occupation or Kiaoehow.

'!'his colonial rivalry for the

maritime provinces nearly reduced the defeated China to the
role ot a spectator.

Even American involvement in Asia

f'ollowing the attachment or the Philippines was followed by.
a casual disregard for the sovereignty and territorial
integrit1 or China.

Alarmed at the tendency toward ex•

elusive partition and control of the China coast by Russia,
Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, with a resultant threat
to American trade, President

McKin~ey

stated to Congress in

1898 that .America could not remain indifferent to events in
China which passed control of large areas of that country
to various European powers.

He warned that the vast commerce

created by American business interests could not be prejudiced by an exclusive treatment b1 these colonial powers
and this ''obviated the need for our country to become an
actor in the seene." 1
'fhis earl1 demand for an open door for all commercial
interests in the area became ~he foundation or .American

. . · 1A• .Wliitne1 Griswold,.!!!!~ Eastern Polic1 ,!! ~
Ynited States (New York: Harcourt, . Brace and tlompany, 1938),
p.

5B2.

7
policf in China and led to deep American involvement in
the intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers or the European
powers in the Far East.

The Open Door polic1 implied

recognition of European spheres of in£luence in A.s ia either
bJ lease agreement, treaty, or mere occupation.

Outside or

the Philippines, United 'S tates policy was directed at pre•

venting preclusive trade policies in these special spheres

ot 1nr1uence.

Nationalist reactions in China and South

Asia to these predator1 moves by the West were quickly
suppressed.

In Southeast Asia the immediate objectives or

resurgent nationalism were apolitical and were confined
mainly to revitalizing all aspects of indigenous eultures. 2
But the Boxer uprising in China took a more militant form
and received the support or the Imperial Government or
China.

During this rebellion, Secretary or State John Hay

declared that the United States• policy was to seek safety
and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and
administrative "entity'' and yet protect all the rights
guaranteed to the ,friendly powers by treaty and international
law.3

How this "entity" could be maintained with these

special territorial privileges created questions of honest
motive.

The defeat of the Boxers was followed by the foreign

, - - . . 2 Ri~~d Butwell, Southeast Asia Todaf and Tomorrow
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19'l>IT, . p.

t>:--

3

'

Griswold, ~· ~., P• 86.

8
occupation of Peking and Manchuria and the imposition of
heavy indemnities on the Imperial government.

However, the

uprising did serve to notify the Western powers that
Chinese and Asian nationalism could assert itself and was a
strong force to be reckoned with against any further en•
croacbment on its territories.
The advent of the Russo-Japanese War again returned
Japanese rights in Manchuria to make her a leading colonial
power on the Chinese mainland.

Here again the concern of the

United States for the preservation of the balance of power
in Asia prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to intervene
tor a peace settlement favorable to the Japanese.

The

previous Treaty of Alliance between Japan and England in
1902 further countered France-Russian designs in the Far
East.

The Far Eastern p0licy of Roosevelt placed little

emphasis on the coDmJ.ercial interests of the United States.4
'!'he Treaty of Portsmouth offered no commercial advantages

to the United States and confined American involvement to
mere "good offices" in this dispute.
.

In fact, the Roosevelt

.

Policy did not admit any great concern for the economic
interests of the United States in the political stabilization

ot Manchuria and the assurance of a continued Open Door
policy.

But this was not so in the case of Japan in

4Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and !:!!! Russo~Japanese
War (Gloucester: Peter .Smith, .f9m, P• 4.
.

9
Manchuria where commercial interests quietly followed
behind the Japanese armies.5

With Japanese "manifest

destin1 " in Korea and Manchuria already assured, it was
onlJ a ~atter of time until Japanese hegemony over all of
Borth China was to assert itself.

The issue of the South

Manchurian Railway was a serious impediment to the Open
Door concept and the guarantee of full Chinese sovereignty
in Manchuria.

The Ta:t't administration attempted to curtail

Japanese control of these vital commercial arteries by a
policy of economic neutralization.

With Japanese and

Russian refusal to surrender their respective rights in
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Open Door
adherents met a serious reversal.

The remaining European

powers vied for closer political control in Peking through

the use of government and private loans to the Chinese
government.
"influence

American participation in such financial
peddling~

was quickly halted by the new Wilson

administration with the President himself asserting that

the conditions of such loans compromised the administrative
independence of China. 6
Throughout the period of 1898 to 1914, American
policies, more than those of any of the other powers,
attempted to maintain equal opportunities for trade and
investment in that vast market.

5~., p. 311.

A balance of power status
6~., p. 172.

10

was established through both economic and political
instruments of diplomacy and while these did not fully
protect the so·vereignty of China, they did prevent the
complete partition of China into cl0sed spheres of
influence.

The United States was an inhibiting influence

against uncontrolled expansion and hegemony by Japan,
Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in Asia through the
Open Door policy.

However, it is significant that this

resulted not from formal policies and treaties sanctioned
b1 the Congress of the United States, but rather by mere
executive acts and agreements.
The outbreak of World War I upset this balance of
power in Asia.

From then on, the so-called Open Door

policy remained only a paper challenge to Japanese ambitions
in China and the F'a r East in general.

Immediate Japanese

occupation of the former German leasehold territories and
the German islands in the Pacific established for Japan,

by right of conquest, a claim to legitimate presence in
China and in the string of islands in the Pacific which
cover the connnunication lanes between America and the
Philippines.

The imposition of the Twenty One Demands on

the government . of China clearly announced Japan's future
expansionist intentions in Asia.

An important development

following the United States• entry into the War was Japan's
effort to win confirmation of her new German conquests prior

11

ace settlement in Europe and in this some success
to a Pe
was achieved. The Lansing•lshii Agreement of 1917 oddly

round the United States agreeing that "territorial
propinquity creates special relations between countries • • • ,"
giving Japan special interests in China, particularly in the
part to which her possessions are contiguous.7
The postwar developments in the Far East soon made
evident to the Western powers that concessions made to the
Japanese during the war created a pattern for £uture
Japanese expansion.

The Japanese eagerness to deploy

troops into Siberia following the Russian Revolution in
1918, coupled with Foreign Minister Ishii's insistence that
Japan had special interests in Siberia, caused considerable
concern in Washington regarding Japan's intentions and was
a factor in the calling of the Washington Conference tor the
Nine Power Treaty in 1922.

The naval and diplomatic rivalry

between Japan and the United States was somewhat eased by
the Washington Conference.

Naval limitations were estab-

lished, non-militarization of Pacific islands was agreed
upon, removal of Japan .from the Shantung Peninsula was
assured, the Open Door policy in China was reaffirmed, and

the territorial integrity of China guaranteed.

A series of

resolutions opened the way for tariff cutting, and the future
abolition of extraterritoriality was discussed.
7Griswold, ~· ~., p. 216.

A second

12

naval limitation agreement at the London Naval Conference
was concluded in 1930. 8 The disarmament provisions of
both these conferences weakened American strength in the
Western Pacific.9

It was hoped that collective security

in the form of the League of Nations would prevent any
turther encroachment on Chinese territory or other
territorial violations in the Far East.
The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 was not
met by any effective collective action either inside or
outside the League of Nations.

The return of Japan again

to an outmoded form of imperial conquest was in part the
result of external factors beyond her control.

10

The

conversion of Japan to an industrial nation created depend•
ence on trade and access to raw materials.

The depression

of the early thirties brought about decisions to raise
protective tariff policies throughout the world, causing
Japan to face the specter of exclusion from the markets of
the world.

11

Manclmria, where Japan had long extensive

interests, became a logical outlet for expansion.

The

strategic weakness of the United States policy during the

8Edwin o. Reischauer, The United States and Japan
( New York: The Viking Press,T957), p. 23.
· .
9John King Fairbank, The Unlted States and China
( New York: The Viking Press;-1:963), p. 9.
10

Rei~chauer, .Qll•

11_ . , p.
Ibi"d

24 •

.£!.!?..,

p.

23.

13
deeade which followed the Manchurian Incident invited
.rurther Japanese diplomatic and military ventures in Asia
which eventually led to Japanese and American involvement
in World War II.

Japanese militarism and duplicity, plus

.&meriean insistence that Japan eonf'orm to the Open Door
policy in China and give up the path of empire in China,
12
led to this collision.
Although the war in the Pacific was essentially a
Japanese-American war, the states of Southeast Asia were
quickly engulfed in the opening phases.

British, Canadian,

and Dutch units were caught in the Japanese sweep through
Southeast Asia and the islands to the south.

Burmese,

Indian, Malayan, and Chinese troops participated against

the Japanese in these early stages, but were soon overwhelmed.

American forces took the brunt of the military

load in the Pacific and almost alone forced Japan and her

.

new wartime empire to destruction and surrender.

13

The

states of Southeast Asia were largely spectators to this
drama though their destinies and political institutions
were to be greatly affected by the war's outcome.
Although the main Japanese effort was directed
against the leading colonial powers in Asia-..Oreat Britain,
12

..

Lloyd c. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal
¥ftlomacz (Madison: The University of .Wisconsiii".15reBS;
9 4J, p. 135.
.
l3Reischauer, .Q£• S,!!., p. 29.

tbe Netherlands, and

France~-it

remained for the United

States to conclude the peace for an area in which she bad
no residual colonial or territorial interests since the
independence of the Philippines had already been assured.
Peace, then, presented new and myriad problems for the
states of Southeast Asia.
Tb.ere bad been no greater influence on these states,
80

rar

as their attitude toward the West was concerned,

tban the long periods of colonial rule and development.
Most of the imperial systems of economic organization,
political structure, and philosophy of government were aimed
at the perpetuation of colonial rule.

Except in the British

and American spheres, there was little thought given to
education and training programs which might prepare the
local populations for self rule.

Native interest in partic-

ipation in government was deliberately confined to the
lowest civil service levels and scales of advancement were
circumscribed to these levels.
e~ucation

In the field of public

this lack of opportunity was even more true and

it usually became necessary for the ambitious student to go
abroad to complete university degrees or acquire technical
education.

Indonesia and Indochina were striking examples

ot this colonial failure to establish training in government
administration. 14

York:

K. King, Southeast Asia .!.!! Perspectiv~ (New
The Macmillan Company, 19~p • . 17.
.

1 4Jobn

15
Except tor the United States and to a lesser extent
Great Britain, none of the colonial powers promulgated plans
with a view to future independence.

Consequently, when

independence finally came it did not take the form of an
orderly transfer of power and authority, but stemmed mainly
trom the confusion following the Japanese defeat in the
Pacific.

Long before the war, strong nationalist ambitions

came to the surface to emphasize the revulsion of the people
against foreign rule and domination.

But most of the states

were very poorly equipped indeed to cope with this new
status of independence and when it became a reality some
important political and economic functions of government
vere neglected in order to cope with emergency challenges

to law and order.15
The concept of the political party as an instrument

ot government was practically unknown and the sudden
wide-spread proliferation of parties in these small countries
led to chaotic situations.

With no party discipline, follow-

ings were sometimes based largely on personal loyalties to
friends rather than party doctrine, and quickly served
ael.t'ish private ambitions which became a nuisance and
hindrance to democratic procedures.

The adjustment of border

conflicts with neighbors consumed much of their international
energies and little thought was given. at this time to the

i5Ibid., p. 18.

16
aore complicated theories of regional alliances.
serious thought given to

t~

Nor was

re-establishment of the

ah&ttered prewar patterns of balance of power in regional
groupings since militant Chinese Communism has not yet
bee~

a reality or threat.

16

During World War II the Japanese attempted to
organize the conquered nations of Southeast A.s ia into a

regional sphere of economic and political development
called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 17 A
specific design of Japanese policy in this area was to
break down the old traditional economic patterns of the
colonial powers and re-awaken the national interests of the
people.

At the same time they would set themselves up as

the protectors of this new philosophy.

The opp0sition to

colonialism was a common cause among these states and this
made Japanese overtures most inviting.

In many instances

the Japanese occupation was originally greeted as a
liberation and the prelude to real independence as soon as

the war was over.

Strong pro-Japanese elements were placed

in positions of leadership and the populace was made to
regard the Japanese as the helpful "brother. «18 The

. .. 16A. D~ak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York:
Ruper and Brothers, 1960), . p.

D

5.

·

-

-

1 7Royal Institute ~f International Affairs, Collective

etence .!!! South East Asia (London:
p. 29.
---- -----

18King, £E.• ..Q.!!., P•

40.

The Chiswick Press, 1956),

17
Japanese pressed tbe economies of the occupied areas to the
tullest and this soon aroused reactions in the form of
protest and demonstrations which were brutally suppressed.
!bi• quickly led to mass disenchantment throughout the

occupied areas.

But the philosophy of a Southeast Asia

sphere of influence did much to nurture the growing
nationalism of the area, and in this sense, the Japanese
were quite successful.

The plans drawn up by the Japanese

Total War Research Institute for occupation policies,
included the following directive:
The desires of the peoples of the Sphere for
their independence shall be respected and endeavors
shall be made for their fulfillment, but proper and
suitable forms of government shall be decided for
them in consideration of military and economic
requirements and of the historical, political, and
cultural elements particular to each area. It must
also be noted that the independence of the various
peoples of East Asia sheuld be based on constructing
East Asia as "independent countries existing within
the New Order . of East Asia" and that this conception
differs from independence based on the idea Qt
liberalism and national self determination. 1 ~
This philosophy of "controlledfJ independence was in sharp
.

.

contrast with the earlier hopes of these peoples and
quickly negated hope for full cooperation by the occupied
atates.

Rather than gain support, the plan aroused rabid

resistance and led to organized underground movements in
support of the Allies.

Thus the role of the Greater

Co-Prosperity Sphere as a scheme for future development
l9Ibid
_ . ..
, P• 26 •

18
did not get beyond the blue print stage.20
The immediate postwar period in Southeast Asia
witnessed considerable confusion and patterns of political
organization varied f'rom country to country.

In many

cases the vacuum left by the Japanese was filled by former
colonial interests.

Temporary "takeovers" of civil

administration by local patriots were attempted in many
instances, but seldom without inter-factional strife.

And,

in almost every case, except China, a reassertation of the
tormer colonial power in the area was attempted and, in
tact, succeeded for a limited period.

The Dutch, after

witnessing a short British military occupation, hastened
to resecure their Netherlands East Indies.

The French,

after considerable political maneuver, were able to
reestablish themselves in Indo-China.

Likewise the

British returned to Malaya and tor a short period to
Burm.a, which had already been promised self rule.
But these returns to the old prewar status quo did
not reckon with the latent nationalism so recently fired
by the Japanese.

The movements for independence and

self-government had indeed made strong headway during the
war and it was not long before these became realities.
Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, Indo..China, and the
20significantly, as late as 1950, the writer saw
.
hanging in a Thai business office in Bangkok, a large
Japanese wall . map of the planned co-prosperity sphere,
complete with legends of raw material sources, :rrs.rkets, ete.

19
PJ:dlippines, under various degrees of difficulty, soon
divested themselves of colonial control and found them•
aelves facing the hard, harsh realities of

self~government.

!heJ were, in most cases, very poorly equipped for the

task.

21

Many of the problems immediately faced 'by these
nations were the consequence of the long process of
Westernization which of necessity they had to accept and
vbich tended to compromise their oriental ways of living.
Bxcept for Thailand, (and to some extent the Philippines),
the legacy left by foreign administration created an
atmosphere of constant suspicion of Western conduct and
policy.

Over long periods this foreign domination tended
to disrupt the old traditional social structures. 22 Edu-

cation, family relationships, law, property rights, police
relationships, and military administration were all altered
to tit the pattern of Western interests.

There was a

consequent weakening of the moral base upon which the local
societies had been founded.

J.

s.

Fu.rnivall, in examining

the effect of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, lists some

ot the failures of the system as reflected in the deteriora•
tion of societal forms:
21

{l) failure of self•government

King, .22• ~it., P• 27.
22
J. s. Furnivall, Colonial Policz and Practice
( Cambridge:
Calllbridge University P~ess, . 1948), P• 2lJi.

20

1Jlstitutions, (2~ increase in crime and litigation, (3) rise
1D religious unrest, (4) increase in indebtedness and
bUsiness failure, (5) tendency toward corruption in judicial
~

and administrative branches or gover1lll1ent.

23

Still fresh in the minds of most Southeast Asians

va• their long and bitter struggle against colonial rule,
and as a residual effect, there still existed a marked
sensitivity to foreign influence and a suspicion of any
aJT&ngements which implied active participation with stronger
Western powers.

Under these circumstances, any concepts of

jointcontribution to collective security and participation
in economic alliances with Western nations, had usually been
moat suspect and very difficult to achieve.
Whereas the new Southeastern Asian states were weak
powers and had little concern in foreign a.t'fairs, Western
interests in the area were vital.
aa well as strategic interests.

This applied to economic
The tin, rubber, copra,

and other raw materials found here had
Veat•s economic life.

be~ome

a part or the

The facilities for obtaining and

protecting these essential raw materials ware likewise a
part of the West's economic life.

The Southeast Asia

landmass stretches like a barrier across the strategic sea
and air routes of East-West passage.

_.,

2 3Ibid .

p. ix.

The significance of

21

aoutheas t A.s ia during the Pacii'ic War was witness to its
iJIPortance, geographicall1 and strategicall1.

Historian

Samual Eliot Morison has stated,
The control or sea communications through the
Pacific and Indian oceans by the United States
Bavy is a "must", • • • since the British have
largely concentrated their now second-class
Havy in home waters.24
Should Southeast Asia fall into unfriendly hands which
aight deny western access to these essential basic
aaterials, the economies of the Western w0rld could be

severely affected.

Senator John Sparkman in a report to

the Senate stated:
If these states were to succumb to Communist
imperialism, not only would they find suppression
or their own liberties, but the free states or the
Western Hemisphere would find themselves cut off
t"rom vital raw materials and compelled to barter
tor their freedom • • • and the aggressiveness
with which the Communist pursue their aims makes
it clear that they recog~ize the vital strategic
importance of this area. 5
!he immediate security interest or Australia and New Zealand,
neighboring as they do the long land masses or Southeast

Asia, makes their voice in matters concerning this area an
important one.

Likewise, their immediate economic life is

closely connected with the economic freedom and prosperity

24samuel Eliot Morison, "American Strategy in the
~acif'ic Ocean,'' Oregon Historical 9,uarterl;y:, Vol. LXII
o. l (March 1961J,1i4.

"
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Senator John Sparkman., "The Far East and Southeast
4J>!ia. Report
for .Senate Committee on .Foreign Relations,
p.c~S~er 1957 1'\liishington: . Government . Printing Ofrice, 1957),
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of the area. Any moves inimical to this :freedom would be
26
of serious concern to Australasia.
Tbs postwar attention to this region by both Chinese
and soviet Communist parties, aroused considerable uneasiness
amODS some Southeast Asian and Western powers.
taken different forms.

ot

18 curity

But it had

If one looks at the European pattern

against possible Soviet aggression, he sees an

integration of forces of the North Atlantic areas, along

with a carefully planned economic integration in the form

ot the Common Market.

In A.s ia, the pattern and tendency

had been almost the opposite.

The former empire protective

alliances built on the concept of total imperial defense had
been splintered and abandoned.

This had isolated Australia

and Bew Zealand to a very great degree.

Here previous

alliances lost their meaning as the British colonies found
independence.27
The newly independent nations of Southeast Asia
became obsessed with their new status and nationhood and

•••med to regard alliances of any type as a sign of weakness
and an infringement of sovereignty.

The flaunting of colors

and national military forces seemed to become a necessary
26Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.),
~stralia in World Att'airs (Vancouver: University of
itish rrol""umbia, . 1963), . p. 11.
2 7Alvin Albinski, ".Australia's De!'ense Enigma,"
~~i!••Foreign Policy Research Institute, IV No. 4 (1961},
A
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exPression of this new sovereignty.

The symbols of

independence could not be compromised.

Emancipation and

nationalism were indivisible, and the nation•state,
glorified in the literature of the West, would not play
28
Even
a secondary role in this era of independence.
though the organization and means for defense against
massive attack were lacking, each new small nation attempted
supert'icial postures of independent military strength.
Aside from the Japanese-imposed Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, there had been other suggestions for
regional alliances among the Asian nations in the past but
none had been of much significance so far as collective
defense is concerned.

A.s early as 1946 there were moves

toward formal regional relationships based on trade and
cultural affinities, which might later lend themselves to
common defense.

General Aung San of Burma spoke for a type

ot Asiatic connnonwealth and a Southeast Asia economic union,
but his efforts were cut short by his assassination soon
atterwards and none of his hopes ever developed.

The next

major move in this direction was the Baguio Conference,
convened in 1950 by the Philippine government.
coincidence, the

u. s.

Quite by

Congress had expressed support for

the creation or a joint organization of the free countries
ot the Far East in the Mutual Defense Appropriation Act of
(I

. 28Rich~~d Butwell, Southeast Asia Toda1 ~Tomorrow

ew York:

Praeger, 1961), p. 172. ----
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1950

• Although no direct connection can be established

~
en the two, it would appear that the initiative of
be.,we
tll8 Philippine government had the active and continuing

•11Pport of the United States.

While not a success, the

Baguio Conference has been called a modest first step in
d,efense cooperation.

29

Prior to the Korean War the concern in Southeast

A•ia regarding CommWlist aspirations was not sufficient to
arouse national leadership in the direction of collective
aecurit1.

Communist aims and maneuvers appeared to be

nen•military in nature and took the form ot political
pressures by minority groups in most instances, particularl7 the overseas alien Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Although

the CoJllllunist threat to Southeast Asia was a growing danger

in .American eyes, to the Asian leaders it was little more
than a secondary concern in comparison with the more
emotional issues of colonialism, nationalism, and neutrality.
They believed that the proper reply to Communism was

economic development, a rising standard of living, and
goTernment programs which would provide for social weltare.30

29

.

Roger M. Smith, The Philippines and SEATO (Ithaca:
0 ornell University Press,"'.""!959), p. 3.
~
.
30
Pb.ilip w. Thayer (ed.)., Nationalism and !To!ress
~~~ As~a (Baltimore: The Johns Hopk!ns l'riss, 956),

t';
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The outbreak of the Korean War quickly dispelled
1;hi• complacency.

Communism now took the form of an overt

ailit&rY threat to the security or Southeast Asia, and with
the entry of the Chinese Communist "volllD.teers" in the war,

the dangers or Chinese subversion and insurgency throughout
Southeast Asia became very real indeed.

After June

25, 1950

lib.en a Soviet equipped and trained North Korean army began
its assault against the Republic of Korea, a feverish series
ot diplomatic events took place.

The immediate action by

the United Nations Security Council quickly rallied the
non-Communist nations against the attack and approved of
the strong military stand taken earlier by the United States.
The American forces were later buttressed by other member
nations.

Desire for closer military alignments among the

nations or Southeast Asia led to the formation of the Melby
Mission.

It was sent by the United States to

determine the military build-up possible in each
of the interested countries of Asia, to recommend
priorities for arms shipments, and to discuss the
composition of American military advisor1 groups
which could be assigned to each country.Jl
Except for Indonesia and Burma, these missions were well
received.

Negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty were

aet in motion by the Dulles mission to Japan, and these
culminated in a treaty or peace at San Francisco in 1951.
'1-ticle 5 of the treaty recognized that "· •• Japan as a

3lKing, 2£•

£!.:!:.., P• 134.

26
sovereign nation possesses the inherent right or individual
or collective defense and may voluntarily enter into
collective security arrangements."3 2 This permitted an
iJIDllediate bi-lateral mutual defense treaty between the
united States and Japan.

This was followed by a tripartite

security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States, the

ANZUS

Pact.

A

Mutual Defense Treaty

between the Philippines and the United States preceded the
ANZUS Pact by a few days, in August or

1951, and further

tightened the collective security arrangements in Southeast
Asia at this critical period.33

To further strengthen its

commitments among the Pacific states, the United States
concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of
Korea in 1953 and a similar one with the Republic or China
on Formosa.
These bilateral pacts established for the United
States a strong network or military agreements in the north
and central Asian Pacific areas and secured, for military

planning, a strategic chain of potential bases and resources
which could be utilized and developed quickly to deter any
further aggression.

Another development or this period was

the very strong warning issued by the United States of its
new concept of "massive retaliation" in the event of recurrent
Communist aggre~sion in any part of the world.
32

p. 18.

.

Ibid., p.

This threat

146.

33The Royal Institute of International Affairs; .2!?.•

~.,
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obviously recognized the possibility that Communist planning
aight easily include sporadic "brush fire" type of wars
which could drain American resources and manpower relentlessly without, at the same time, exposing either Peking
or Moscow to any retaliation.

In defining the adminis•

tration's strategy in further detail, Secretary of State
Dulles signified the foreign policy implications of massive
retaliation.

He stated that local de.fenses would always

be important, but there was no local defense which alone
would contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world.
Therefore, local defenses would have to be reinforced by
the .further deterrent or massive retaliatory power.

He

declared .further that when a potential aggressor is
glutted with manpower, he might assume that resistance
would be confined to manpower.
He might be tempted to attack in places where such
superiority was decisive. The way to deter aggression is .for the .free community to be willing and
able to respond vigorously at places and with means
of its own choosing.34
There was immediate emphasis on mobility of forces, with
troops held in a central reserve, ready to strike in any
part of the world with highly mobile nav.al, air, and
ILllphibious units.

The use of nuclear weapons was implied

in this newly defined massive retaliation concept.

State

.34statement of John Foster Dulles, Department of
Press Release No. 139, March ,16, 1954.
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These new strategic doctrines were not accepted
without debate.

Within the administration itself, the

»emoeratic opposition questioned the wisdom of committing
one to full scale war when merely the suppression of "brush

tire" type of

provoca~ions

equally effective.35

with limited arms would be

Debates weighing the relative values

ot the foot soldier versus the megaton bomb were rampant
in the press, both in the United 'States and abroad.

European

tears that carelessness or intemperate decisions of a few
men might embroil the entire world in a nuclear catastrophe
were not without some foundation.

Vice President Nixon

gaTe an explanation which did little to allay these fears.

He stated:
Rather than let the Communists nibble us to
death all over the world in little wars, we would
rely in the future primarily on our massive
mobile retaliatory power which we could use in
our discretion against the major source of
aggression at .the time and place that we choose.
We adjusted our armed strength to meet the requirements of this new concept and, what was just
as important, we let the world and the Communists
know what we intended to do.36
A great restraint was shown by the United States
in seeking support for its policies.

Dulles did not feel

that the time was practicable to draw a line which would
bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia

35

..-

King, .21?• £l!., p. 182.
36
.
New !!2.£! Times, March 14, 1954.

29
a formal mutual security area.

1nto
8 uch

He thought that nations

as Indonesia and Burma which had just won liberation

_ trom Japanese aggression and political freedom from
colonialism would hesitate to assume security rela"
Wes t ern
tionships either with Japan or with the Western powers, and
as a practical matter,
• in Indo-China and Malaya, assistance must be

~i;en largely through France and the United Kingdom,

a procedure which many in Asia find repellant, as
promoting ''colonial imperialism." Some countries
are yet unable or unwilling to qualify for definite
security arrangement under the Vandenberg formula of
"continuous and effective self help and mutual aid."
Lastly • • • the United States should not assume
formal commitments which overstrain its present
capabilities • • • treaties now made involve islands
where security is strongly influenced by sea and air
power • • • 37
Despite the bitter Korean experience and the Indo-China
crisis, there remained a natural disinclination on the
part of the United States to show any strong initiative
in creating a collective security arrangement for all of
Southeast Asia.

This reticence and studied restraint was

entirely within the bounds of good and patient diplomacy.
An error in assumption or timing in such matters could have
serious adverse propaganda value in the Communist press.
Still working toward security the United States feared that
the cessation of hostilities in Korea would lead to the
diversion of additional Communist pressure to Indo-China.
Ii'
37 Joh~ Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific,"
..Qrei~n Affairs, Vol. XXX, Noo 2 (January, 1952), 182 • .
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Consequently there were strong arguments for a more active
United states role in establishing a Far Eastern security
pact.3 8
There were calls for an American sponsored NATO
tJPe tr~aty for the Asian area and this bo~d idea had
strong support in the Philippines and Thailand.

But the

otticial American attitude was much more restrained.

The

United States would give every support to a collective
security arrangement in the Asian area, but it was largely
up to the nations of Southeast Asia themselves to decide
upon the scope and time for such an organization and for

them to take the initiative in arriving at a meeting of
minds on the subject.

In October, 1953 the Assistant

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter

s.

Robertson, had this to say on the matter:
Those both here and in the Far East who have
recognized the desirability of a common defensive
effort in the Asian Pacific area have looked to
the United States government to exert its influence in favor of such a pact. We continue to
believe, however, that any effective Asian
Pacific organization must come about as a result
of the Asian•s own initiative; that it must wait
upon a general appreciation among the Asians of
the desirability of collective action in attacking
their common problems. This is clearly not a
field in which outsiders can usefully assert
themselves. We do not wish to give the impression
that we are trying to hustle or joggle our friends
across the Pacific, because we are not. Any moves
3BKing, .2£• ~., p. 148.
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to be made in the direction of regional organization
are clearly up to them.39
Whether the small nations of Southeast Asia were yet ready
to join in common interest and defense of their lands and
liberties was not long in being determined, and the
disaster to the French armies in Indo-China at the hands

ot the Vietminh Communist forces was to become the catalyst.
39oepartment of S,tate Press Release No. 549, 1953,
quoted by .King, .QE.• .£!:!:,., P• J.49.

III
REACTIONS TO PROPOSALS FOR coLLmTIVE ACTION
Events in Indo-China in 1953 and 1954 aroused grave

ooacern among the nations of Southeast Asia and this concern
iparked hectic political and diplomatic activity among them
•• tbeY re-examined their security positions.

Among the

Asian nations, ethnic differences still played a large part
in keeping them apart.

Old enmities and suspicion of the

neighboring country still persisted, resulting largely .from

long histories of border wars.

Differences in languages,

41aleets, societal forms, and religion, further complicated
ettorts for political and economic cooperation and so long

as inadequate and archaic educational systems prevailed, the
. . jority of the people would continue to harbor these
hatreds and suspicions.

In addition, any pact with the

Western World which might suggest a neo-colonial organization
with non-Asian leadership, would certainly meet very strong

opposition.

The only immediate existing regional group in

Southeast Asi~ were the Columbo Powers made up of India,
Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesiaw•so named .from their
meeting in April of 1954 at Columbo, where they attempted to
torm an economic bloc for mutual development, supported to

•ome extent by the British Commonwealth nations.

Defense or

Political alignment was not an organic part of the Columbo
Plan.
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The question of collective security for this area

found

e~ch

government concerned, including Australia and

le¥ Zealand, faced with very strong political considera•
•ions at home.

The following study examines, in part, some

ot the problems faced by both those countries who became

aignatories to the Manila Treaty, and those who refused to
participate in this regional alliance.
I.

NATIONS WHICH ACCEPTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

In the case of Australia and New Zealand, there was
close accord with the concern of the United States for
Aaian security.

Very important to the ·decision later made

b7 Australia and New Zealand,· is an understanding of the
ABZUS Pact as a precursor of the Manila alliance. 1 Signed
at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, this security treaty
between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was,
in tact, part of an inter-related system of defense arrange-

..nts which steI1D11ed from the Japanese Peace Treaty.

These

included, among others, the treaty between the United States
and the Philippines, and the treaty between Nationalist
China and the United States.
Similar to the NATO agreement, the ANZUS Pact was
4es1gned to conform to the spirit and design of the United
1see Appendix

c,

p. 162, for text of the ANZUS Treaty.
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Jations Cbal'ter.

But, unlike the NATO Pact, it

di~

avoid

the constitutional difficulties which might arise in the
"a

11ordi ~

or the defense commitments and caref'ully left the

aoTereign power to declare war to the member states.

Pro"

yiaion was made for the independent constitutional
procedures within the ANZUS Pact (and all subsequent defense
agreements involving the United States).

In this instance,

the defense provisions were made to read,
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on any or the Parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger i~
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Realistically, the Australians saw this

trea~y

not as a

tormal NATO structure, with definite •command' -responsibilities, but rather as a re-expression of a "Monroe
Doctrine" theory which bound the United States to the
assistance or Australia and New Zealand in case or need.
'1'he Australian Minister or External A:f'fairs had this to

aa1 about the alliance:
ANZUS provides the means whe.r eby we can consult,
government to government, with the strongest nation
in the Pacific, the United States of America•-not
only the strongest nation but also our firm and
declared ally. ANZUS gives Australia access to the
thinking and planning of the American Administration
at the highest political and military level • • •
Finally, ANZUS ensures that our own interests, both
Political and military are kept before the United
States-•and this is or major importance when we
2Australia, Treaty Series, 1952 No. 2, cited by
Bo1al Inst., .2.E.• cit., p. 175.
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consider the complexity of the issues facing the
united States and the many countries .whose
separate interests must be taken into account by
the Americans in global planning and strategy.3
!he Pact recognized the immediate concern of the signatories
,

0

the CoJ11D1Unist threat and aligned Australia and New

Zealand with the United States in an endeavor to strengthen
the security of the countries of Southeast Asia.

By the

terms of the treaty, it gave Australia and New Zealand
assurances of American military support and assistance in
the event of an armed attack.

It served as well to allay

the tears of a segment of the Australian public of a

resurgence of Japanese militarism following the signing of'
the Japanese P~ace Treaty.4
There is further intimation that ANZUS was a precursor to the Manila Treaty by noting the wording of the
Preamble to the Treaty which states that it looks toward
the development of a more "comprehensive system of regional
aecuri ty in the Pacific Area. 11

This phrase is again

repeated in Article 8 as a justification for impowering the
.UZUS Council,
to maintain a consultative relationship with States,
Regional Organizations, Associations of States or
other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position
to .further the purposes of' this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

3R. G. Casey, Friends. and Neighbors
P. W. Cheshire, 1955), .pp. 53~. · · · ·

(Melbourne:

4o.ordon Green;ood an.d Norman Harper (eds.), Australia
1 !orld
li
Affairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia,
63)' p. 62. . .
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It is interesting to observe that ANZUS Council activities
bf.Ve continued in this spirit up to the present time.

reoent

A

report of the SEA.TO Council at Bangkok declared:

United States officials e.x;pressed special
appreciation for recent contributions to the war
effort by their ANZUS partners. The Council noted
with satisfaction that the members of ANZUS had
increased their assistance to South Vietnam. since
the meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Council in April, 1964. The ANZUS ministers
agreed that they should remain prepared, if
necessary, to take furthar concrete steps within
their respective cagabilities to assure the defeat
or this aggression.~
The exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS

Pact was a sensitive issue in both Britain am.d Australia.
British interest in the Pacific and her historic participation in the affairs of the area certainly could not be
easily dismissed, nor could her strength there in the form
ot naval, land, and air forces in both Malaya and Hong
Considerable bitterness and resentment was felt iR

:long.

Great Britain that so prominent a .friend and long time
United States ally should have not been invited to join in
\he agreement.

At the time the Pact was signed, the

British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, tried to
•1nimize the significance 0£ the United Kingdom's exclusion
when he stated to the house 0£ Commons that,

it would not have been unwelcome to us 1£ we had
been included in the proposed pact • • • His

A

5"SEA-TO: 19.54-1964 A Stabilizing Factor in Southeast

6~:t,~ Quoted in International Organization Vol. XVIII, No. 3,
,;;J9.
11
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M ·esty's Government in the United Kingdom are,
:;ertheless, entirely satisfied that Australia
nnd New Zealand should represent the interests of
~he Un~ted Kingdom and the Commonwealth as a
whole.
A rew months later, the new Conservative Prime Minister,
Winston Churchill, did not conceal his feelings when he
stated to the House of Commons that he had inherited the
situation and regretted the manner in which the ANztJS Pact
was arrived at without British participation.
However, there were strong and compelling reasons why
the United States objected to the inclusion of Great Britain
in the ANZUS Treaty.

First, the United States was by no

means sympathetic at that time to any arrangement which
would have committed American obligations to the defense
of colonial territories such as Malaya, Hong Kong, and
British Borneo.

And secondly, if Britain were included in

the military provisions of the Pact because of her geographic
and colonial interests in the area, so would it be necessary
to invite the Netherlands and France as well.
the intent of' the ANZUS Pact.

This was not

The alliance was very limited

in scope to the three English speaking Pacific powers and
was, in fact, very restricted in its military authority and
Planning.

This would consist of the ANZUS Council of Military

Starr Members who were to meet occasionally at Pearl Harbor,
6George Modelski (ed.), SEATO:
1 W
• .Cb.eshire Ltd., 1962), p. 55.

filz Studies (Melbourne:
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Wellington, or Melbourne .for military stat'£ discussions.
!lJU81

the military emphasis on the ANZUS Pact alone

restricted its interest and scope in the Pacific.

At the

ti.118 the Treaty was signed, the representatives o.r the

.,aber nations emphasized that this was intended to be just
the beginning of building up security arrangements in the

Paoitic.
The press tended to minimize the Treaty's importance

and .trequently made unfair comparisons between ANZUS and
D!O.

Such reactions gave early strong arguments .for

participation in the larger, more comprehensive, alliance
which was yet to come.

Australian hopes .for a strong

SA!O-tJPe agreement did not take into consideration the
crucial di.f.ference between the North Atlantic nations and
those

or

Southeast Asia.

The same mature political conditions

tor such a NATO-type agreement simply did not exist.
B. G. Casey, in defending the Treaty said:
We still do not know how such a wider system of
security will come into being. For the present,
the essential political conditions for such a
s1stem do not appear to exist. I do not find that
there is yet that co:rmnunity of interest and readiness
to assume, in advance, far reaching and precise
military obligationa on which a treaty of alliance
like NATO is based.1
However unreasonable the press and public opinion might have

been regarding tbB significance o.r the ANZUS, the Pact has

7current Notes, XXIV, November 1953, quoted in
elski, 22 .~., P• 57.

Moel
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essential part in the Pacific defense structure.
pla1ed an
Al'}lough the SEATO organization has superceded to a large
extent most of the functions of the ANZUS Treaty, it remains
la effect and its councils continue to be held.

The ANZUS

C011JlCil held its thirteenth annual meeting in Washington on

3911 17•18, 1964, attended by the New Zealand Prime Minister
leitb Holyoake, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

a• well as the Secretary of External Affairs for Australia,
P. Basluck. 8

The fact th.at the ANZUS Council of Ministers

itill meets regularly, as well as the Military Staff Council,
would support the contention that this alliance has a
oharacter and function distinct from SEA.TO, and that function
is playing an important part in South Vietnam today.
A

Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and

the United States preceded the ANZUS Pact by a few days
and t'm'ther tightened the collective security arrangements
in Southeast Asia at this critical period.9 . President Truman

1tated on April 18, 1951,
The whole world knows that the United States
recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines
would be looked upon by the United States as
dangerous to its own peaci and safety and that
it would act accordingly. 0
(~

a·Department

of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 1310,
•gust 3, 1964), 146.

'lh..~

9

See Appendix B, P• 159 for text of the United States•

&~~lippine Mutual Defense Treaty.

lo

New

~

·

·

Times, April 18, 1951.
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association with the United States in defense matters

... certainly not new to the Philippines.

Of the many

..vlJ independent Southeast Asian states, she alone had
. .l"T8 d
~

a long political and military apprenticeship with

United States.

Unlike Thailand or Pakistan, the

lldlippines had a strong American orientation which
logically resulted from her history as an American depentencJ until 1946.

Asi~e

from many connnon traditions and

institutions, the close military association of the two
eo11Dtries during the war with the Japanese created close
and binding friendships between many American political
and llilitary leaders.

In addition, the immediate outpour•

1Dg ot American aid for indemnity and reconstruction

following the Japanese surrender amounted to more than
1.5 billion doilars. 11 This made possible the early
apectacular recovery of the Philippine economy.

The manner

ot granting Philippine independence, as promised prior to
the war, further created an atmosphere of mutual trust and
respect.

Despite this new independence, the Philippines

relied upon the United States in matters of defense and
&creed to the retention of American naval bases at Subic
Ba7 and Sangley Point, as well as an air · base at Clark Field

tor the

u. s.

Air Force.

Whether these extraterritorial

41
rigbt 8

would continue palatable to the Philippine citizen
.

aac! the opposition parties after !Ull economic and political

1Jldependence was achieved, had to be seriously weighed by

both Philippine and American defense planners.

As economic

growth increased, so would economic dependency on the
United states decrease and with it the day to day ties and
oontacts that would keep the two nations in close associati on.
As an insular republic of over 7,000 islands with a

yery heterogeneous tribal complex, the Philippines faced an
illaense task of internal domestic development which fully
occupied the postwar government for many years.

Stable

goYernment, land redistribution, reconstruction, unemployaent, and Communist subversion, were among the many problems
to be resolved.

From the start, the Philippine leaders took

a strong anti...Communist stand during the transition from
colonialism to independence.

Aside from the organized

Bukbalahap rebellion during the early 1950s, there had
been little evidence of militant communism, (although some

ot the areas coming more recently under the influence of
Indonesian political pressure, especially in the Moslem
ialandJ, have witnessed some unrest).

During the Korean

Var, the Philippine government bec~e strongly aware of the
Potential dange.r of Communist subversion, and, still
bitterly conscious of the Japanese occupation not many years
before, this may have stirred interest in the need for

oollective security.
to~ard the

It was directed almost entirely

United States.

After a meeting in 1949 with Generalissimo Chiang
Kaishek of the republic of China, President Elpidio Quirino
].auncbed a series of talks among Asian leaders on tbe
iubject of some form of Pacific pact which might offer a
118

tem of regional defense.

In August of the same yea:r,

be expressed the same views before the United States Senate

and received good support for his proposals.

With Nationalist

China and the Republic of Korea in favor, he called for a
conference of Asian leaders for May 1950 to take place at
Bagiuo, in the Philippines.

This conference was attended

b7 representatives of Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Few

or

the

participants had authority to indulge in little more than
exploratory talks on :matters of collective security.

Other

aspects of mutual area interest were take n up, including
trade and cultural exchanges, but few definitive recom•
aendations were made. 12 The effort of Carlos P. RolllUlo at
the United Nations during . 1950 to ''secure a closer union

aaong the peoples of Southeast Asia, dedicated to the
ll&intenance of peace and freedom in the region through
appropriate methods of political, economic, and cultural

. "i2
.
M. Smith, The PhiliRpines and SEATO (Ithaca:
,Roger
00 Pnell University
Press,71959), P• 3. · · -
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tion with one another" did not succeed as hoped.
••opera
.
sident of the conference, Romulo was authorized in
A• pre
tib8 tinal statement to communicate recommendations to the
participating governments and make suggestions on the
111Ple.mentation of the few agreements arrived at.

These

related to cultural and social matters and had little
,.litical significance.
Although disappointing for the Philippine leaders,

•bi• conference

did manage to bring together the significant

leaders of Southeast A.sia far talks on subjects of common
eonoern.

This was an accomplishment.

The Indo-China crisis,

11)doh tollowed so soon after the Korean armistice, was an
eTent that strongly influenced the Philippine decision to
work in the direction of a security pact for the Pacific,
aillilar to NATO.

However, prior to this, Claro M. Recto,

an opposition leader, had wielded wide influence in
adTocating a Philippine orientation toward Asian neighbors,
'••ed on national and racial grounds.

With the Undersecretary

tor Foreign Affairs, they guided foreign policy with some
••coesa on the slogan at

t1

Asia for the As'ians. t1 l3

Aware of

\be •ollllting concern both .by the conservatives . in government
lad.

the military leaders over this extreme nationalist

Philosophy, President Ramon Magasaysay made a strong statement

194.$

13Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomaci of Southeast Asia:
• 1958 (New York: _ Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 84. -
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1954

reversing this trend in P.b.ilippine•American

Philippine-Asian relations.

Wlth .full approval o:f his

ngressional leaders he asserted:
There is no incompatibility between the political
and economic ties and solidarity o:f aspirations in
eace and in war, which have bound our two countries
ltbe Philippines and the United States) :for more than
half' a century, and our warm desire to .become good
neighbors in Asia in a united e:f:fort, imposed by
geographical propinquity and racial af.fi·n ities, to
achieve the general prosperity o:f this region.
Rather, these two comple.mentary objectives should
give us that balance~ foreign policy which we have
lacked in the past.14

Bllt, unlike Thailand, her security needs were not so
c1emanding.

She was sheltered fro?ll the C0mmunist China

. .inland by a friendly Formosa, the

u. s.

and hundreds of miles of the China Sea.

Seventh Fleet,
This geographical

1ecurity became a source of Philippine reluctance to enter
iato any formal declarations or warnings against .further
aggression by the Viet-Minh and Chinese in Ind0•China.
llhen Secretary of State Dulles approached the countries or
South.east Asia for such a joint warning, President
Kagsa1say was wary and did not wish to lend support to any
.. aaure which would antagonize .fellow Asians and possibly
oontinue the French colonial presence in Indo..China.
1n April

1954,

But

Magsaysay gave support to any moves that

Would establish a NATO type alliance in the Pacific area,
Provided that the following conditions ware met:
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Pi st that the right of Asian peoples to self-de•
:mi~ation is respected; and second, that the
te lippines be given a plain and unequivocal
Pbiarantee of United States hel~ in case of attack
~der our Mutual Defense Pact.

5

!be•• preconditions

guaranteeing self•determination were

J.a'9r to be attached to the Manila Treaty in the form of
~ Pacific Charter, inspired and 'sponsored by Ramon

1ag1a1say.
In the case of Pakistan, the history of its associa-

•ions with the United States in any alliance was very recent
aacl limited indeed.

Quite dramatically, the date of the

SBA.TO agreement marked a further deterioration of relations
between Pakistan and India and the United .S tates and India,
vi'h a corresponding improvement in India's relations with

Oa1111unist China.

The initial links with Karachi started

cblring the government of Mohammed Ali following his visit to

Vaahington at the invitation of President Eisenhower.

As the

teraer Pakistan Ambassador in Washingt@n, his personal eon•
kots and influence am'o ng Americans was considerable.
Z...diately after his elevation to the office of Prime
Minister in

1953,

his initial request for emergency food aid

vaa soon forthcoming.
1111.lion tons of wheat.

The United States quickly granted a
Concurrently, talks were begun toward

a autual military assistance agreell'Snt to strengthen Pak:istan•s

So

,

~5Rep~blic of the Philippines, Official Gazette, Vol.

(Apr11

1954),

11
--.;;!.
p. 102.

quoted in Fifield, !h!, .Diplomacy of Southeast
, .. "
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in the general defense of the Middle East.

With

rakistan divided geographically, bordering both on
So•theast Asia and the Middle East, her pivotal position
ill the geographic and political divisions of these areas

wa• quickly recognized. The nation's capitol, Karachi, is
situated in West Pakistan and its natural political affiliations tend to follow Moslem patterns. 16

As a member of the

ColllJllbO Plan, she was the only member of that group to
•ltimately become a signatory to the Manila pact.

Both

Dalles and Vice President Nixon made visits to Pakistan
ill the same year.

These visits were returned by the then

Pakistan Commander•in-Chtef, Ayub Khan, and during his stay
in Washington., a Mutual ·s ecurity Assistance agreement was

1igned May 19, 1954, followed by an agreement for friendly
oooperation with Turkey in the west. 1 7 With these essential
a11ociations binding her closely to the non•communist,
•on-neutral blocs, there was little hesitation on the part
ot the United States and others to invite Pakistan to
participate in talks regarding a collective defense agreement
in South.east Asia.

The motives which prompted Pakistan's leaders to
enter into both the Mutual Assistance pact with the United

l6The Royal Institate of Iaternational A:f'fairs, ..e,:e.

!,.1~., p. 28.

17

Modelski, .2.:2•

~.,

P• 131.
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and later the Manila Treaty are somewhat obscure •

.,ents leading up to these associations offer some interestiDI conjectures. It is interesting to note that Pakistan
... not among the Southeast Asian nations that Dulles had
eriginally

appr~ached

for a joint warning to Communist

CldD&, although he did contact Pakistan and Ceylon a few
4&JS later for consultations on "general matters" relating
,0

southeast Asia. 18

The ~ !.2£! Times reported in May that

1aldstan was bent upon bringing all the members of the
Columbo Powers except India into the alliance, thus isolating

ID4ia politically and militarily and rendering Pakistan
leadership in Southeast Asia paramount. 19
During a visit of the Pakistan Foreign Minister
Zatrullah Khan to 'Washington, he placed great emphasis on
the Connunist threat to East Pakistan, and the necessity

tor his government to keep troops alerted .in that area.
Kia visit was the last step in paving the way for Pakistan's
Pl'••ence at the Manila conference.

While little has since

been heard from Pakistan about the Communist threat to

Bast Pakistan in particular, these early alarms gav~ weight
to its agreements tor full association in SEA.TO.

It would

appe&l' that despite the morbid fears of aggression against

this eastern border, one of the real intentions in the

P• 132.

19New ~ Times, May 28, 1954.

48
alignment with the Manila Pact powers was to create a

,_ren •e
..

potential against possible Indian military adventures

,..sulting trom the Kashmir issue, and to give it a strong
)land as well in this territorial dispute.

Considering the

reluctance of the other Columbo Powers to join in the Manila

!reatJ, Pakistan's acceptance did help in

c~ntributing

to

tM •Asian content" o:f the membership.
The issues which :faced Thailand during this period

..re mu~h dif:ferent :from those of Pakistan or the Philippines.
!here could be no question that her geographical position on
the mainland o:f Asia put her in a most vulnerable spot

regarding military and subversive encroa.c bment from Communist
China.

A small but stable state, Thailand has had a

reputation for adroit political maneuver which managed to
keep her independent for centuries, despite colonial dominations surrounding her.

By carefully playing the ambitions

ot the French in Indo-China against those of the British
in Burma and Malaya, a remarkable history of uninterrupted
independence was maintained, much to the envy of all Asia
(the Japanese occupation during World War II notwithstanding).
Kan7 critics think Thailand's readiness to compromise

Principles in pursuit

o:f

this independence might not make

her a staunch partner in any alliance.

Whether this is

•till true is difficult to say, but it is interesting to
note that the same political leaders who had led Thailand
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accommodation with the Japanese in 1941, without
pto an
token resistance to the invasion, were the same

•••ll

pelitical clique which led Thailand to join the Manila

Paot ot 1954•
A look back to the Thai position in 1941 is important.
It is known that historically, Thai thinking, both political
and economic, came under strong British influence.

Even

tod•J the leading export houses for tin, timber, rubber,
aJld copra are essentially British.

Such names as Anglo-Thai

Cerp. Ltd., Bombay-Burmah Ltd., The Chartered Bank of India,
1lib9 Hong Kong &: Shanghai Banking Corp., go back to the days

ot Britain's Empire and were, indeed, appendages of that
aaae system.

The historic British concern for Thailand was

its own interests in Malaya and Burma, and, naturally,
Great Britain feared the presence of any unfriendly governaent in Thailand.

Nevertheless, this British orientation

vaa ot little va,l ue in 1941 when Thai Premier P.h.ibun Songram

bowed to the threat of invasion and joined in full partnerahip with the Japanese military occupation. 20 While British
forces were pi~ned down in the fruitless defense of Malaya,

they were unable to rally sufficient defense for themselves
-

and could give no thought to assisting Thailand.

The failure

ot any Thai resistance left Britain's northern defenses open

It t

·20 · . . .

John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of United

h 0ab es Policy in Southeast Asia," quoted in Henderson,
lems .2.£ United States Policy, P• 7.
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and contributed very much to the British capitulation at

Thai apologists point to the 1941 debacle as a
111gapore.
in failure to implement treaties of friendship with
1esson
iolid guarantees of military assistance.
In

1954

Thailand's def'ense problems involved two

main categories, external aggression and subversion.

While

not bordering directly on Communist China, her northern
neighbor, Laos, is a friendly but small and weak buffer.
!o the east lies Cambodia and Vietnam, while to the west
1• tound Burma, with Malaya to the south.

Her shores on

the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean create a considerable
coastal defense problem.

The national and political splin-

tering created by various ethnic groups found along Thailand's
borders has always made her an easy target for treachery
and subversion during any overt military action.

During

the 1950•s Malaya was heavily involved with the ''emergency,"

battling a serious threat of admitted Communist insurgents;

Burma, too, was faced with similar insurgency from the
Karens and a Communist rebellion, while in Indo-China, a
bitter struggle ensued between the French and the Communist
Viet-Minh.

Consequently there were very strong reasons for

!'hailand 1 s concern for her own security.

Above all, there

had persisted ror centuries the problem of the thousands of
alien Chinese, whose loyalties to their adopted fatherland
had always been suspect.

This potential threat of subversion

baa been a most important consideration for all the mainland
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oelJJltrieS
J.eDt>th in

of Southeast Asia, and will be examined in greater
a following section of this study.

Tb.Us Thailand, of all the nations of Southeast Asia,
11&8 been the most directly concerned geographically in its

iecuritJ and defense problems.

The Thai signature to the

lanila Treaty was not her first step in mutual cooperation.
As early as the late
ll&Y•

1940's, successive Thai governments

turned to the United States for assistance in internal

4eYelopment.

Foreign aid and Point Four projects have

proliferated through.out the provinces of Thailand.
111 tems,

Road

hydro, and irrigation schemes, were developed with

American help.

Cultural and social ties with the United

States were strengthened with exchange programs, Fulbright
grants, training programs in mechanical fields, and medical
aid programs.

A considerable amount of interest in inte.r nal

1ecurity and stability directed American efforts to a broad
police training program, long before eny thought was given
to military aid.

This early apprenticeship with Washington.

was further expanded at the outbreak of the Korean War, when
!hailand contributed a contingent to the United Nations
forces.

These forces were trained and equipped almost

entirely through the U• s. Military Advisory programs• 21
21 ·

.

On 24 November Pravda announced that the United
8
£!:t!s was transforming 1$ailand into a military base for
ll1 r can aggression. It . maintained that the technical and
lita.ry agreements, concluded between Thailand and the
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At the time of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Thailand indicated
a readiness to play a part with the United States, had the
•a Conference not ar.r ived at a satisfactory cease-fire.
Gen••
Vith this recent background of close military and political
&180 Ci

ation with the West, it is not surprising that Thailand

toWld herself a keystone in the Manila alliance with her
oapitol, Bangkok, eventually to become the head of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
In addition to . these nations that accepted invita•ions to join in the Manila conference, there must be
oonsidered, as well, the arguments of those states which,
though invited, refused to participate after careful and
long debate, in most instances.

Some, of course, like the

f?oee states of Inda-China were disqaalified by the parties

to the Geneva Agreement.

It is not surprising that Communist

China and the Soviet, Union rose with alarm at the spectre

ot a military alliance openly dedicated to the containment
ot Communism within its present borders in Southeast A.sia.
And it is not surprising that they would bring strong

pressures and propaganda forces to bear on the nations of
Aiia in an attempt to limit the effectiveness of such an
alliance.

:n1ted States .had established complete American military
(ontrol. M. Beloff, Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia
Oxtord: Ox.ford University Press, 1953), P• 240-;---
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NATIONS WHICH REJECTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

..

Of the so-called Columbo Powers invited to the Manila
oonterence, India was without doubt the most important.

By

territory, population, and resources, she was certainly the
aost influential as a counter-balance to Chinese Communist
expansion and the new Chinesepolitical orientation of the
border countries. 22 And India's influence and cultural
attiliations with Southeast Asia were centuries old.

For

i;hese reasons alone, she would have been a giant mnong the
.A.aian participants.

But the official attitude of the Indian

govermnent from the start was one of hostility.

Even during

the preliminary hearings on the Manila invitation, India

took a strong position against any Asian participation and
clid much to dissuade the other Columbo Powers who had
interest in such an alliance.

Her strong pressure on Burma

and Ceylon will be discussed below.

One cause of the Indian

Government's opposition to the Manila Treaty was the

prevail~

ing mistrust of most Indians for British and American motives.
Ber long period of imperial domination had not been forgotten
in six short years.

And her fear of Pakistan's new strength,

which was growing with Am~rican assistance, further hardened

her attitude against the alliance.

With her buffer to the

north, Tibet, already absorbed by China, Indian sensitivity
22
p. 93.

.
Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.E•

.£1.i.,
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to cbinese displeasure was very acute indeed.

The border

along the McMahon line were a constant political
u1putes
u-ritant between China and India. And this new political
aligDlllent appeared to worry Prime Minister Nehru even more.
lfbeD he received the joint London-Washington inquiry asking

tor views on the projected conference, he advised the
Indian Parliament that the government did not intend to
depart from its avowed policy of neutrality, and intended
to promote peace and resolve conflicts by peaceful negotiation, rather than by accentuation and threats or display
ot torce.

His opposition became even more adamant as the

Manila conference drew to a close.

He had this to say:

Our Hon. members may remember to old days~•they
appear to be old days he said • • • when Great
Powers had spheres of influence in Asia and
elsewhere-•of course the countries of Asia were
too weak to do anything. The quar.r el was between
the big powers, and they, therefore, sometimes came
to an agreement about dividing the countries into
spheres of influence. It seems to me this particular
Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction
ot spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful
countries, because ultimately it is the big and
power.tUl countries that will decide and not the two
or three weak and small Asian countries that may be
allied to tbem.23

lehru•s conviction that any collective security pact which
included former colonial powers represented a reactionary
colonial thl>eat to the area, that it would be an obstacle

SIA " 2.3Rosemary Brissenden, "India's Opposition to
,01:o~i ~Australian Journal . of Politics~ History,
, _ o. 2 . (November 1960),~o5. . ..
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to peace in the area and that Asian nations adhering to it

••re acting

contrary to the best interests of the Asian

peoples, was reiterated time and again in his dealings
1fith the other members of the Columbo Powers.
The Indian government expressed its official views
D the subject subsequent to the treaty, in early January

ss at Madras

19

during a meeting of the Indian Congress Party.

It said that,
the establishment of a South East Asian Defence
Organization by some Great Powers of the West and
some States in South East Asia, is regrettable and
has added to the insecurity of that region and
extended the area of cold war.24
!he resolution further stated that peace could only be

ll&intained by the five principles of co•existence and it
welcomed the proposal for a meeting of all the independent
l.aian and African states, a proposal which led to the
Bandung Conference of April

1955.

Of the invited Columbo Powers, Ceylon, like Pakistan,
waa inclined to accept the proposals.

Her relations with

Iadia, though close, had long been strained by the problem
of large migratory invasions of South India Tamils, mostly
YI.grant unemployed laborers in search of food and work.
India did little to control the emigration and Ceylonese
officials likewise had difficulty in coping with the situation.

p.

94.

24Royai Institute of International Affairs,

.Q.E.•

.2.!!•,
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Vitb similar heritages of British imperialism, they held
PJlilar suspicions of Western ways.

But the Ceylonese

rr1.11e Minister, Sir John Kotalawalla, regarded any move

t11at might strengthen Ceylon's prestige in the Commonwealth
aad world as a national advantage and did not like to
.na~ordinate

his country's ambitions to those of India.

This

)lad been the case during the Empire.

India's attitude appeared to stiffen when Pakistan
and Ceylon began to show a readiness to participate in the
lanila conference.

Although of a regional nature, the long

41 1 pute between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir problem

bad been a bitter major foreign policy issue that had even
reached the portals of the United Nations.

In fact, at this

period, each considered the other a threat more awesome
•han Chinese expansion to the south. 2 5 With India and
Indonesia leading the core of opposition among the Columbo
Powers, it was left to Sir John Kotalawalla and U Nu of

:au.a

to challenge . this leadership and promote a more

apirited attitude towards the problems of Southeast Asian
4etense.

It was his intention to encourage more open dis•

911.asion of the issue.

With this in mind, Kotalawalla proposed

\bat a meeting be held in Rangoon to reconsider earlier

Policy statements regarding the Manila plan during a meeting
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iwnbo ministers in Ceylon.
ot C0

Both Burma and Pakistan

vere anxious to participate in such a meeting but Nehru
~nt h e was too busy to leave. 26 When Kotalawalla
ata ted t.uo.
'11eD suggested a meeting in New Delhi for the convenience

ot the Indian leader, Nehru admitted that he thought the
Colwnbo decisions were already made and open conversations
would have a divisive effect on the solidarity of the
ColU111bO Powers.

Indian diplomacy at this juncture appeared

to have three major goals:

(1) to secure unanimous Columbo

Power rejection of the Manila invitation, (2) to accommodate
and support Communist China·ts position

d~ring

the Geneva

Conference, (3) to encourage Communist China's guarantees
ot peaceful intentions through the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co-existence (Panche Sila). 27 These principles
proclaimed:

(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial

integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-inter-

terence in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and
..tual benefit, (5) peaceful co-existence.
The Prime Minister of Ceylon had to keep in mind the
1trong influence the large Tamil and Indian segments of his
pOpulation had on his gove~ent, and it would appear that

he had difficulties w1thin his cabinet on this issue.
1-ediately following Nehru's decision, the Ceylon government
26
2

Brissenden, .2.E.•

7Ibid., p. 228.

~., P• 221.

58
11 1ue

d a communique stating that,

Ceylon would not be able to participate in the
on.ference which had been proposed to be held
;egarding S~TO, and the authorities concerned
}la.Ve been informed accordingly. Ceylon, however,
is prep~~d to maintain an open mind on the
subject.
With a common border, Burma was one of the most
exposed of China's neighbors and there were compelling
reasons for this small state to be much concerned with her
relations with China.

Like Thailand, she too had a serious

iDternal problem with alien Chinese and dissident tribal
border groups.

Soon after independence in 1948, she was

taoed with the Karen uprising, followed a short time later
bJ an open Communist rebellion, with extensive breakdowns
ot law and order in large areas of the country.
Like Ceylon, a similar conflict of opinion seemed
to exist between Burma's U Nu and Nehru.

While there had

been a history of conflicts on many issues between the

Columbo Powers, U Nu was usually found on the side of
India.

However, at the !Columbo meeting U Nu revealed

lliaaelf as an independent and did not agree with the
•xpressed Indian view that most rears or Commun.1 st eneroach-

..nt were greatly exaggerated.

He reminded Nehru that Burma

lived too close to Communist China to regard underestimating
the Communist threat as harmless. 29 That the Burmese too

2a · ·

Brissenden, .Q.E•

Bi-i

.£..!!.,

p. 223.

29
Ceylon Daily News, Columbo, 8 May 1954, quoted by
ssenden, .2.E.•
p. 222.
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,..re

disappointed in the f'ailure of' the Rangoon meeting to

•ake place, there could be no doubt.

Although there were

·nt official denials that Burma was willing to join
treque
SJlfO, privately,

aanY high Burmese officials expressed their belief'
that SEATO. was a good thing and might serve as a

rotector of Burma's independence, even though
~he Bur.mesa government could not join it f'or f'ear
ot antagonizing Communist China.30

earma has never shown any hostility toward

SEATO. While

abs could not join for political considerations, she has,
in tact, derived some com.fort from Thailand's strong
aeabership in the organization and welcomed Thai assurances
'1lat SEATO would aid Burma against China if called upon.3 1
Indonesia, like India, was openly antagonistic
•ovards such an alliance and, like India,
sider open debate on the sabject.

•o

the

re~used

to con ..

At the time the invitation

conference was received, the th.en Prime Minister,

Dr. Sastroamidjojo, enjoyed the support of the Indonesian
0011111unist

Par~y

in Parliament, so his opposition to the

!reaty was not surprising.

During a visit to India after

the Manila conference, he declared bef'ore the Indian
Parliament that the "peace in our part of the world cannot

be assured by military pacts such as the recently concluded

30wii1iam c. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy
Cl.lllbridge: Harvard University. Press, i963), . p. 101.

(

31 rb·

~.,
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1132

President Sukarno. a strong proponent of
,
Columbo principle, felt very adamant that the Columbo

Jlallil& pac t • .
~

?over S

should stay unified in purpose.

He said that "the

J&l'dstick is whether any action of ours in the field of

foreign affairs can be reconciled with out national
pterests and with the spirit of Panche Sila."33
Here again, the presence of a large Chinese
aiDority created some influence in the Indonesian Parliament.
It was only after the signing ·.o f the Treaty on Citizenship

with Chou En Lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister at Bandung,
'118.t their thorny Chinese problem was settled.

This did

llUOh to strengthen Indonesia 1 s ties with Communist China.

£t the earlier Bagiuo Conference, Indonesia had made some

atrong statements against joining any blocs !'or external
aecurity.

The chief Indonesian delegate stated,

It is to our interest and that of our neighbors
that we refuse to take sides with this or that
nation or group of nations, that we keep open
the political, economic, and cultural t .r affic
lanes of the Indi~p and Pacific Oceans that cut
across Indonesia.J4

loon after the signing of the Manila Treaty, Secretary of
State Dulles .r emarked during a visit to Indonesia that he
appreciated that Indonesia did not believe it needed the
32
p. 99.

Royal Institute of International Ar.fairs,

))Fifield, . .22• ~., p. 160.
34Ibid., p. 166.
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tection or SEA.TO and stressed that the organization was
. .
onlJ tor those who felt the need or it. Nor did he place

pro

anJ relationship between the granting or foreign aid with
one•s membership in any mutual security pact with the
1faited States. 35

Judging from recent events in Malayasia,

with Sukarno's determined policy of "conrrontation,"
.

.

Indonesia 1 s presence in SEA.TO might have been a dangerous
liability.

-

35Ibid., p. 161.

IV
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND SUBVERSION
The problem of political subversion of governments,

1dth or without violence, has been a very important defense
ensideration during the past twenty years.

In Southeast

Aaia in general and more especially Thailand, Burma, and
'1le Malay archipelago, this has become particularily acute

bJ the presence of a large unassimilated mass of the Over•

••• Chinese, alien to the areas in which they reside, and

loJ&l in most cases to the Chinese homeland, regardless of
'1le political regime in power in China at the time.

This

has been a centuries old problem in Southeast Asia and has

alva1s caused serious concern on the part of the local
10Ternments.
Whether this concern merits the label of "the Chinese

Problem" has been subject to debate for many years.

Prior

\o the Communist victory in China in. 1949, there had been

little evidence of Chinese ambition to create a political
dominance in Southeast Asia, o.r even to unify Chinese
ainorities into a Chinese political party.

To the contrary,

OTer the year·s in which the national government was weak
the1 had maintained an attitude of aloofness and indifference
'

0

Political involvement.

That this attitude persisted for

IUch a long period, implied . a deliberate Chinese withdrawal
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tr,,.

the national political life within the states of

aoutheast Asia.

Exclusiveness and political isolation did

oontain some danger, and programs in education and legisla•ion to help assimilate these Chinese were undertaken by

ao•t governments.

British Imperial policy, however, was

eentent, in many cases, to let these ethnic groupings remain
&I a check and counterbalance to the indigenous political

parties.

But, it would be very much in error to suggest

that the Chinese had completely isolated themselves !'rom
the political fabric of the country.

Those who thought

that their examplary political propriety would continue
..re soon disillusioned soon after the triumph of the
COllllUDist Revolution in China.

As early as 1949 the Chinese

CCllllllUDist regime began making strong political overtures to
"1aese Overseas Chinese and in January of 1950, the

!!2,

!! Kung

a Shanghai newspaper, had this warning to make regard-

lag the brethren in Southeast Asia:
Now that the People's Republic of China has been
established and diplomatic relations have been opened
between the Cent.r al People• s Government and a number
or other countries, the more than 10,000,000 Overseas
Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further
abuse.
!he article went on to say that in accordance with Article

S8 ot the Common Programme of the Central People's Govern•
..nt, every effort would be made to protect the legitimate
Pigb.ts and interests of Chinese .r esiding abroad.

These

"&rnings from Peking began to take on a more threatening
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the new Communist regime became more and more

teJl9 as

1

t1J'lll entrenched.
Few people have underestimated the
1
effect of the Overseas Chinese in this part of the world,
•iac• tbeY have been a strategic, economically powerful
atnority whose importance has been even more enhanced by
'118 kith and kin ties with the Communist homeland and the

CJ)dnese propensity for family loyalty. 2

The non•assimila-

•ion of minorities within a country does not in itself
oonstitute a threat to security, but the concentration of
eoonomic power and poll tic al influence within a minority
oan be a real threat.

During residence in Thailand, the

eiter quickly learned that most Thais maintained a dual
attitude toward their Chinese neighbors.

•o maintain and foster

They were happy

the cultural exclusiveness of the

Chinese but deplored this same exclusiveness in the economic
and political sphere.

The same attitude has been reflected

in government policy.
With the disappearance

or

'Western colonial rule in

Southeast Asia following World War II, the growing importance

ot the Chinese in replacing the European in the economies of

'1le new states has had wide repercussions.

The Chinese

111.grations to Southeast Asia over the centuries have been for
1

. .

•Victor Purcell, !!12 Chinese in Southeast Asia
non. Oxford University Press, l~l), p. 693.

(Lo d

2

-

G. William Skinner, Chinese Society 1B Thailand:
I9'~alytical Historx (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
, p. v.
-
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65
· obJ"ective •
.. economic

It is only within the last century ,•

following the expansion of Western colonial influence, that
'118 yolwne of Overseas immigrants reached large and alarm-

1118 proportions.3

As early as the seventeenth century,

aaropean docwnents have mentioned the presence of several
'1iousands of Chinese in the old Siamese capital of Ayuthia.
JNring the period of the Tribute missions to China under the
Jling Dynasty, mention is made of the return of Chinese

pottery makers to Siam at the request of King Ramkamb.aeng of
Sukhothai in 1300.

Even before this, there is evidence in

'11• ruins of the old Khmer civilization at Ankor Wat that

Oldnese fishermen and merchants occupied large stretches of

'he Gulf

of Siam.

Most of the migrations to Southeast Asia

haTe originated from the southern Chinese coastal cities in
Pukien, Kwangtung, and Hainan Island.

Population pressures,

rather than Chinese policy, prompted these emigrations to
the more abundant lands to the south.

Before the nineteenth

oentury, such movements were officially illegal and prola1bited by the Imperial Government of China, but with
eontrol almost non•existent and easily manipulated through
•orruption, the traffic flowed unimpeded into Southeast Asia.
!otal Chinese population figures vary, but most authorities

3Richard J. Coughlin, Double Identity, ~ Chinese in
liciern Thailand (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
66), p. vii.
1
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agree
)Order

on approximately 15 per cent to 20 per cent in the
countries of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China.4
The control maintained on the economic city life

bJ the

Chinese in these regions has i'requently been

c1eaonstrated.
111

As early as 1910, Chinese strikes and riots

the city of Bangkok, in protest against a general head

tax, completely stopped all trade and essential markets for
ll&DJ days.

The Thais realized for the first time the

strength of the Chinese economic grip on the country and
tme abl. li ty of this minority to paralyze the life of the
Kingdom.

Thus the dislike and fear earlier felt by the

aovernment now found support in popular sentiment.5
Another irritant and concern of the governments of
Southeast Asia was the proliferation of Chinese secret
societies.

While such organizations as the Triad and Yee

Bong societies operated many beneficial programs which
covered such diverse interests as language schools,
1-dgration aid committees, burial assistance, etc., their
activities frequently assumed political significance and
lent clandestine support to indigenous political groups
Within the country.

But their inter-society rivalry sometimes

led to serious outbreaks of street fighting and lawlessness.

Ge
41. Dudley Stamp, Asia: A Regional and Economic
- ograph:t: (London: Methuenand-Company, . 1962), p. 512.
5Skinner,

.Q.E.•

.£l:..i., p. 160.
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The strongest pattern of Chinese influence in the

r these countries has been their control over nearly
11te O
all aspects of economic activity. This phenomena of Chinese
bU&iness energy and acumen is prevalent throughout this
eutire region, and is very obvious in such cities as Bangkok,
Singapore, Saigon, and Djakarta.

This economic p.r oblem is

the most outstanding to the new nations of Southeast Asia.

Bttorts to curb Chinese control have led to strong immigration
6
laws and occupational restriction.a.
Exclusive Chinese work
itoppages and strikes have had crippling effects in Malaya,
fbailand, and Vietnam where Chinese labor organizations have
been strong. 7
Throughout their history, the people of China have,
perhaps to a unique degree, felt themselves culturally
1uperior to these southern races and their view of the
native populations of Southeast Asia has been, for the most

part, disdainful.

This contempt has naturally bred bitter

reaction among the iocal native citizens. 8
&110

The Chinese have

organized strict family and dialect associations, and

6Kenneth P. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand (New York

and London:

Oxford University Press, 1'941.,.-;-p. 205.

·

7Rob~rt s. Elegant, The Dragon Seed. Peking and ~
0
-"•l'seal! Chinese (New York: . St. Marti'iil'S"""Press, 1959T'; p. 9.
8
(
Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), P• 15.

68
1'Usiness societies, but because of their minority status,
'1J8Se hB.Ve confined political expression to their organization officials.

These heads have been recognized by the

D&tional governments as quasi-official spokesmen for the
Chinese elements in the area and are treated by them with
oonsiderable protocol.
&I

And these contacts can likewise act

channels between the local government and Peking.
Traditionally, all Chinese governments have adhered

to the ~oncept of dual citizenship for their nationals
oTerseas.

This, in effect, has induced the Chinese to
aaintain th~ir loyalty to China. 9 Their importance in
Cllinese nationalist movements is of ever increasing interest,
particularly while the Chinese overseas increase in substance
and affluence.

Since the turn of the century, they have

had a strong hand in most revolutionary movements in China,
and in the case of Dr. Sun Yatsen, prepared both the organ-

ization of revolution and provided the financial support
almost entirely.

The question of dual nationality became an

illportant issue du~ing the Bandung Conference in

1955,

and

on this occasion Premier Chou En-lai agreed to Indonesian

4emanda that this dual privilege be eliminated.

Thereafter,

•Tery Chinese in Indonesia had to make a declaration of

nationality.

There was hidden in this offer to the other

oountries pres~nt that proper recognition of the People's
9 .. . .

King,

.Q.E.•

.2.!!•i p. 71.
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of China was a prerequisite to the solution of
.....
10
'11!B nationality problem.

•0
11.

M~ent

yer~

The continuous struggle which has been going on

1949 between the Peking and Taiwan governments for
eupport of the Overseas Chinese, represents an extension of
91JlC8

'118 long Chinese civil war, concluded on the mainland, but

oontinuing in the Straits of Formosa, and has taken the

torm of a propaganda war.

Both these governments have

f.llplored their nationals to be "good citizens" of the
ountries in which they dwell, yet neither has ever fully
a• cepted complete severance of ties with the homeland.

Not

to be outdone by the Nationalists1 the Chinese People's
Republic has launched an ambitious Overseas Chinese program,
incorporated in the Constitution.

Article 98 states:

11

The

P•oples Republic <:J: China shall protect the acquired rights
and interests of the Overseas Chinese. 1111

Within the Conunu-

aists Party's Central Committee, three organizations from

t he central government take responsibility .for these interests.
!he first is the Commission for Overseas Work, the .function
ot which is to plan and direct propaganda among the Overseas
Chinese; the second is the Third Office of the Bureau of
Vllited Front Work which has the responsibility for organizing

<>Tersea~e Chinese participation in the "democratic movement";
~

.
Philip w. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Pro~ess
?re! Asia (Baltimore: The Johns .Hopkins Press, 196), P• 147.

Oxi'0

10

ll

'

'

.

.

A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia {London:
~d University Press, 1960), P• 182.
--- -----
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third is the Social Department of the Chinese Communist
-

raJ"tJ's Central Committee. which has a general intelligence

aa'11ering mission.

In addition to these. a coillillission of

O'fel'seas Chinese A:rfairs has been established in Peking under
'118 Government Administration Council with the same rank as

a ministry.

This organization was set up to organize re-

"11'Dees for study and indoctrination in Communist China. as
..i i as to foster the purchase of government bonds by the

()'lerseas Chinese as a means of increasing remittances.
VealthJ Chinese overseas have been wooed and flattered into
npport of the Co1?1'1unist regime. often making red carpet
.tsits to the mainland as state guests of the government.
these overseas organizations have been taking an increasing-

lJ active interest in the Chinese af'fairs of Southeast
Aaia.

The propaganda programs are extensive.

Despite appeals

\o the Overseas Chinese for loyalty to the countries in
which they reside, Ho Hsiang-n1ing, ·C hairman of the Overseas
Ohinese Affairs Commission in Peking. has urged them to

•Telop closer ties with the homeland and stated that
"nobody can sever the bond which ties the Chinese residents
abroad to the fatherland.

Mainland China is the homeland

ot all Chinese." 12
In devel~ping these close.r ties. the Chinese Commu-

lliata have undertaken a wide dissemination of popular
12

B~nett •

..22• .£.!.:!!•• P• 189.
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11tera

ture and dialect broadcasts, and have made

attempt~

ant teaching in the Overseas Chinese schools. They
•o s l
established large scholarship progrB.Ills for study in

)1aT8

ahina and finance students liberally for this.

This type

of political and idealogical sponsorship bas increased
rapidly during the past eight years, and in turn has inoreased the concern of the governments involved in these
o•ertures.

That the People's Republic of China has seen

tit to utilize these Overseas Chinese for their own subveraiT• political ends, has become a serious problem and a
..nace to the integrity of these small nations.

In order

••remove the irritating effects of Chinese dual nationalit7, the Chinese Communists have taken steps to meet the
ill41vidual government's suggestions.
Chou En-lai to India in

1954,

During a visit of

Prime Minister Nehru

reminded Chou or the apprehension caused by the presence

ot a large Chinese population with dual nationality.

In

hia speech to the National People's Congress on September 23,
19.$4, he referred to this subject:
For our part, we are willing to urge the over•
seas Chinese to respect the law or the government
and the social customs or all the countries in
which they live. It is worth pointing out that
~he question of nationality of the Overseas Chinese
s one which the reactionary governments of China in
t he past never tried to solve. This placed the
overseas Chinese in a difficult situation and often
l ed to discord between China and the countries
concerned. To improve this situation we are prepared
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settle this question and are ready to settle it
~~rst with the Southeast Asian countries !1{ich have
established diplomatic relations with us. 3
The policy of the People's Republic of China toward
)191'

neighboring Asian states, has derived strong influence

,,oa

previous Chinese hegemony in the area.

The Chinese

OGlll"mist regime stands in direct succession to an old

Japerial Chinese tradition 'Which consistently held that
O)dna, by virtue o.f its superior civilization, was entitled
'9 take a preeminent position among her neighbors. 1 4

This

pelicy was interrupted for the long period between 1840

aa4 1919 by the rise of European colonial influence.

Mao

fae•tung spoke in 1936 o.f his vision "to lead the Chinese
revolution to its completion and also exert far-reaching
llltluence on the revolution in the East as well as in the
wllole world. ,,l5
The essence o.f this old Imperial system prior to

1840 was the existence of a satellite belt, 'Whereby China
wa1 1urrounded by subservient "client" states••Korea,
Iaclo-China, Siam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Tibet, Nepal,

lala1a, and even parts of Indonesia.

China's actual rela-

\ionship with these "tribute" states varied f'rom place to
Jlace, but always to~k the f~rm of a .formal tax obligation

Pe BS. 13Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.E• ~.,
111 ,."'b 14navid P. Mozingo, "China's Relations with her Asian
~ors," Current History . {September, 1964), 156.

15 rbid.. .

--.-•• P•

157.

13
to china, usually in the form or elaborate gifts.
token

These

contributions were meant to emphasize China's

pse••Jdnence

and power over her neighbors.

Today, her

taterest in these states as buffers to what she considers

predatory colonial systems, is a paramount consideration

et

bel' .:roreign policy.

While China has not made excessive

owertures for :friendly relations with the non-Communist
••ates of Southeast Asia, she has made no attempt to con•
...1 her strong interest in ultimately realizing their
rewolutionary conversion to the Communist ideology, and
Jaa8 actively encouraged.Asian Communist parties to follow

'tile path of the Chinese peoples" in seizing power. 16

Aside from political interest in the areas, there
Jaaa been the more important economic considerations as well.

&a

the People's Republic or China transforms gradually :from

an agrarian to an industrial economy, so will her demand
mac! need for these vast raw mate.r ial supplies become more

acute.

The population explosion in present day China has

laeen a serious concern to her leaders and the world in
&eneral.

The rich resources or Southeast Asia offer abundant

IW.pplies of food, industrial raw materials, and fuel.

These

wo.ld appear to be the logical answer to China's problem.

lhlraa and Thailand rate as the leading producers and
16Liu Shao-Chi, "Inaugural Address to the Asian-Aus~
la~ian Trade Union Con!'erence," November 23, 1949, quoted
-l.lr:r'ent Historz, September 1964.
\it
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eJ.'Porters of rice in the world.

t or

a]JlloS t

Southeast Asia accounts

90 per cent of the world's supply of natural

Indonesia, Malayasia, and Thailand together con,.t>ber•
tribute to world trade about 60 per cent of its tin. Other
pr!Jl&r1 products in less commanding positions, such as
,.trolemn, tea, copra, palm oil, hemp and hardwoods are very

plentitul.

Likewise the strategic location of Southeast

&ala, with its good inland waterways, and excellent
]larbora, have made it a target of both Chinese and Japanese
~er the

years.

China's control of the East-West sea lane.s

Jaer• -could deprive both India and Japan of important

eoenomic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

It

would also endanger Oceania and the still free countries
111

the western rim of the Indian Ocean.

They could

interrupt traff'ic from the Persian and Aden Gulfs, as
..11 as the Ports of East Af'rica. 1 7 While the United
tates has been represented as the sole deterrent to
Ohineae ambitions in this direction, there is no doubt that
India's similar interest in this region has already created
&heated rivalry with China, bota ideological and commercial.
The use of' subversive techniques in attaining internal

JIOlitical control of countries since World War II has been
att..pted frequently by the Communist leadership, both

. 17 ...
William Henderson (ed.), "The Communist Challenge
!k~outheast Asia., " Southeast Asia: . Problems of United
---~"""'"'-=8 ,tolicy (Cam.bridge: The~ _ Press, 19631"; p. 134.
to
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So• i •

t and Chinese.

This danger to Southeast Asia was,

very real and became an issue of prime consideration

!Jl4••dthe
'
_.,zig

proponents of the Manila Treaty.
.

Subversion was

-A.at like the illusive ghost and made the problem of
·-.,....,_
oo12Dteracting it very complex and difficult.

Its forms have

be•D hard to identify and isolate since subversive activi,

181

otten border on the legal procedures of normal

goTermnent process, but the aims are directed to the over•
'11?'oW of the established political order, often in the name

ot treedom or liberty.

The usual forms of attempted sub-

Tersion are the armed insurrections witnessed in the
Philippines, Malaya, and South Vietnam, or the more
reatrained combinations of general strikes and riots as in
lillgapore and prewar Shanghai.

The methods the Communists

haTe employed in the direction of subversion have varied
from country to country, depending a great deal upon the
political maturity of the people.

Known methods have been

to exploit small internal dissensions, arouse racial
111.norities when they exist to revolt against "suppression"
Ind to foment civil strife with the use of indigenous
C11mnm1st party members or anyone dissatisfied with the

•tatus quo.

There are many who believe that it is almost

iapoasible to . cope with this menace. 18

In stating the case

18sEA.To REPORT, "The Second Year," Bangkok, 1957.
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,.tore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary
et state Dulles had this to say in 1954:
To .go on now to the question of subversion,
as I pointed out, we deal with that in this treaty
aore specifically than we have with any other
treaty. We recognize the danger more clearly. I
JllUSt admit that the mere fact of recognizing the
danger does not mean that we automatically have
tound a way to meet the danger. Subversion in that
area is a very difficult thing to control. It is
virulent, it is well organized, it is efficiently
prosecuted by trained persons, and the task of
meeting that threat will tax our resources and
ingenuity to the utmost • • • This threat is most
acute at the moment in .Vietnam, but I understand
there are threats of the same character to Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand and Malaya, and Born!Q and
Indonesia are not free from the danger. ~
Singapore serves as a good case study in subversive
'9.otics.

This former Crown Colony, the activities of which

are almost entirely COI!JID.ercial, is a city of extremes in
..alth and poverty.

Despite it being a Malayan city

..ographically, the population is more than 80 per cent
Gldneae, one-half of whom are under twenty-one years of
age.

This mass of youth has been fired by the great

IROceas of the Chinese revolution.

Many programs of travel

Ind student exchange have taken place between Singapore and

tile People's Republic of China, at which time the Chinese
Ce11aun1sts have been active in organizing party cadres, labor
111l1on cells, and Chinese school indoctrination.

Their tools

laaTe been the usual methods of terror, threats, bribery,
~

.

lel ti
John Foster Dulles, Hearing Before ~ Senate For;ign
ilnf J>ta! Committee, November. 11, 1954 (Washington: Govern.
Printing Office, 1954), P• 14.
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i•il disobedience, and effective manipulation of the

C)liDese population against civil authority.
,

0

Police reacti0n

OoJDJlunist tactics in many cases appeared to feed the

In referring to the Malayan government's effort to
fire I•
eoabat rebellion, Victor Purcell states,
fbe great danger for the Government was that it
might allow itself to be led into repressive
action against sect'ions of the population which,
willingly or unwillingly, were assisting the
communists, and this would arouse enmity against
itseu. 20
Thailand too has faced a formidable menace or
intiltration.

Announcement or the formation or a "Thai

Autonomous Peoples Government" in south Yunnan Pr0vince was
ll&de by the Peking Government in January,

1953.

It stated

that this was a Chinese administrative arrangement to give
oultural autonomy to the ethnic Thais of southern China.
However, it soon became evident that this plan was being
u1ed in the north for the purpose or indoctrinating Thai
foutb.s in Yunnan for the organization of Communist cells
ill northern Thailand.

Quick action and exposure or these

activities by the Thai Government at Bangkok did much to
•inimize the effectiveness or the program. 21
The task or countering subversion is, by its nature,
\he responsibility or the respective governments, but certain

20
21

.
Purcell, .21?• ~., p. 293.

King, .2.12• .2,!1., P• 192.
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pot1ers decided that there was real need tor coordination

ot counter-subversive activities in the various countries

ot this region.

This cooperation could provide a clearing

)louse tor intelligence reports and set up programs in
...eloping counter-subversion techniques.

t the Manila Treaty powers.

This was an aim

v
PRELUDE TO THE MANILA. TREA.TY

The rapidly deteriorating position of the French
forces

in

Indo-China created an atmosphere of grave concern

tor the security of the states contiguous to this area.
Despite disclaimers to the contrary, the events in the late
aontbs of 1953 and early 1954 led to a gradual change of
the official United States position on the matter.

The

'

fiet Minh forces in Indo-China, with increased aid from the
Chinese Communists, were very methodically disrupting French
plans for ultimate victory and resistance was steadily
crumbling.

Under the circumstances, the United States took

the initiative in sounding out its Western allies and the
interested nations of Asia on the advisibility of a collective defense treaty.

During the sanguinary progress at

Dien Bien Phu, the United States ann0unced that the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political systems of China or
Russia, by whateve.r means, would constitute a grave threat
and would not be passively accepted.

'S ince talks with he.r

allies had already been in progress when these views were
expressed, it is obvious that a tacit understanding had
&l.l'eady been reached with the Western partners and the
Preliminaries for full scale talks with the Asian members
were already underway.

A flurry of diplomatic activity at

this time, which included visits to the United States by
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Sil' Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden, as well
.. talks in London and Paris by Secretary Dulles, indicated
substantive decisions were being made regarding this

'1:J,at

'1'.lreat t o the Far East. In April, 1954 the British and
United states governments issued a joint communique which

aaid in part that the events in Indo-China,
• • not only threatened those now directly
involved, but also endanger the peace and security
of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western
Pacific, where our two nations, and other friendly
and allied nations have vital interests. Accordingly, we are ready to take part, w:it h the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of
the possibility of establishing a collective
defense, within the framework of the Charter of the
United Nations, to assure the peace, security, and 1
.freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.
There is no question but that the Indo-China

c~isis

in 1954 served as a springboard for the Manila Treaty, and
Ul.e joint communique quoted above was an immediate prelude

'° such a treaty conference. 2

Coming at the time of the

acheduled Geneva conference, the British Government was
anxious that no action should be taken which might prejudice
'1le negotiations taking place there on the Indo-China

'1lestion.

Since Britain had long recognized the People's

lepublic of China, she found herself in an awkward position
!'egarding her posture at the Geneva conference, as
1
2

p. 3.

well as

Joint Communique·, CMD.9282, lli,9;., p. 2.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, .21?..!.

£.ti?..,
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ill her negotiations with her Western allies covering a
18cur i

ty pact in Asia aimed against Chinese threat of

· n•
aggressio

Her unenviable position was strongly sup-

ported by the French who, facing a debacle at Dien Bien
lhDi were hard pressed by the French electorate to conclude

some arrangement ending the Indo-China war.

The long drain

on her manpower and treasure had reached the breaking point,
aDd the French Premier, Pierre Mend~s-France pledged his
political

~ire ~

and the life of his government on a

scheduled conclusion of a treaty to end the French
participation in this war.

At this point, the United

States could ge,t no more than a declaration from the
P.rench that they would be willing to examine the possibility
ot establishing a defense pact.

Actually, Secretary of

l tate Dulles strongly belfeved and pressed his conviction
'1lat entering immediately into some kind or formal arrange-

..nt with the Asian nations and the Western allies would
illnensely strengthen the French hand at the Geneva round
\able.

The rall of Dien Bien Phu and the hopelessness of

'1le French position quickly persuaded the British and
'ranch to associate themselves with a formal declaration of
intent to participate in a conference to conclude a collective defense pact for Southeast Asia.

With no

IU&l'antees seriously binding the parties to a Geneva
aci-eement, such a pact now was considered to be a necessity
'

0

deter the victorious Viet-Minh and Chinese Communists
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frO'/A breach of faith in the Geneva talks regardless of the

conference.
e11tcome ot the
It had been Bri tain 1 .s intention to withhold any
aotion ~ntil obtaining the full support of the Columbo
f01fers··India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia.
foreign Minister Eden, continuing his constant contact with
'1:18 Asian members of the Commonweal th during the conf'erence,

gave his opinion that th.ere would never be any real
iecurity in Sou;t heast Asia without the good will of the free
uian oountries.3

Nor did he think any organization could

'9 etfective without the understanding and support of the

Columbo Powers.

In this regard and at Eden's insistence,

Ule British arranged a meeting of the Collllllbo Powers for

'1ae purpose of hearing their views in regard to such a treaty.

!here was such strenuous resistance on the part· of India and
Indonesia, that the meeting actually never took

I

place.~

Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, found
themselves in close accord with the concern of the United
States regarding Southeast Asian security.

But, in

patient regard for the awkward position of the British,
'he Australians did not openly criticize British caution.

lovever, Australian leade.rs did remember the earlier

p. 5.

3Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.I?• ~.,

4Brissenden,

.2.E.•

£.!!., p. 221.
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ntions of H. V. Evatt in 1947 when, as Minister of

•OD te

Jx'•rDal Affairs, he gave a detailed postwar policy
,..,teaent regarding Southeast Asia.
po1101

He said Australian

should include the ''development of a system of
.

..gional security in cooperation with the United States

5 He predicted that as the people of
04 other nations."
1outheast Asia acquired independence and ceased to be
ependent upon the decisions of European governments, the·o
weuld Australia's interests in the councils of A.sia inoreaae proportionately.

During this period of hectic

eTents leading up to the Manila Treaty, Australia's

ca1e1 used his substantial inf'luence among the Asian
..abers of the Columbo group to moderate their views, but
h no purpose.

In the interim, A.ustralian public opinion

'9oame fearful of the Indo...China collapse and pressed for
10•

security arrangement.

The Sydney Morning Herald had

'1lia to say:

For America and Britain, the defense of Southeast
Asia may be seen as strategically desirable; for
Prance it is a matter of national prestige; but for
Australia it is life and death. If the cork is
torced out of the bottle, in Mr. Eisenhower's
graphic phrase, and aggressive communism floods
over the peninsula into Indo-China, Australia will
be placed in immediate and deadly peril. The
security of Southeast Asia is Australia's security. 6

a

5

Leice~ter Webb, "Australia and

SEATO I

H

-~es, George Modelski . (ed.) (Melbourne: F.
' p. 51.
.
- .
. .
6
.!bid., p. 61.

SEA.TO Six

W.

Cheshire,

It

now just a matter of time and the fall of Dien Bien

1ff.1

_

.

!Jiil until active arrangements were made for a discussion of

• '1'••t 1 •

During a speech in the House of Commons in

lalJ• Sir Winston Churchill explained that it was the hope

et the British government that if an acceptable settlement
et the war in Indo•China were to be negotiated at Geneva,
.-an• might be found for getting countries which participated in the negotiations to underwrite the settlement •
.. )loped that other countries with interest in the area
111.gbt subscribe to such a guarantee.

It was this view

'11at he and Foreign Secretary Eden advanced to the American
aoTel'Dlllent and the proposal was one of several being

eDllined by a joint Anglo-American committee.

i'his group

wa1 also studying the question of Southeast Asia defense,
fer, as the Prime Minister stated, it was necessary to

flan

-t,

•not only for the contingency of a negotiated settlebut for other eventualities less agreeable."7

He

..nt on to say that arrangements for collective defense
ill Asia would proceed whether or not any agreement was

reached at Geneva though their nature would depend on the
reaul.ts

or

the coni'erence.

Armistice agreements which ended the Indo•China
laeatilities were signed on July 20, 1954 at the Geneva

,. 4..

7Royal Institute of International Affairs, .QJ?• ~.,
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oeJd'•l'ence.

Finding themselves differing with the Commu•

1111t powers over the terms of a reciprocal guarantee of

'111• settlement, the United States and British governments
..cided to underwrite and guarantee the terms of the
,.eva settlement by a defense treaty. While the Columbo
1
?overs did not take any part in the Geneva meeting, they
414 express their satisfaction with the results of the
i ..eva eonference and gave strong support to the a.gDee...t ••

With events moving swiftly, the United States, after
eonsultation with the other interested powers, arranged for
a oonterence to take place at Manila, which was to convene
on September 6, 1954.

Thus, it remained for the first

effective regional organization in Southeast Asia to come
-'out as the result of Western, rather than Eastern
initiative.

The eight nations which participated in the

oonterence were Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
l'Jtance, Great Britain, the .Philippines, and the United
ktes.

In his opening address, Dulles declared that the

United St~tes felt "a sens·.e of co~on destiny" with all the
•euntries of the area and all were united by a common danger
arising from "international communism and its insatiable
labition." 8
.8

New

He further hoped that the embodiments and
..

!Qt!5 Times, September 6, 1954.
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,wuc ture

of such a pact would leave the way open for the

9'):19r nations of Southeast Asia to eventually participate.
1a•t prior to the opening of this eon.ference, Vice Presi4_.t Carlos Garcia of the Philippines and Secretary of

a-.te

Dulles took part in a meeting of the Philippine-

taited States Council set up under the United States•
ftdlippine treaty of 1951.

At this meeting Dulles stated

•in the most emphatic terms, that in the event o.r any

attack on the Philippines the United States would honor
.r.llJ its commitments under that treaty and would act
tmaediately." 9

Similar sentiments were expressed by the

other national leaders during the opening statements, but
rald.atan emphasized her concern for aggression. from any
1earce, besides that o.r Communism, and hoped that the
re1Ulting pact would cope with such threats.

After these

eponing statements were made, the con.ferenee went into
oloaed session until the treaty was written.

While the

United States viewed the pact only as a bulwark against
COlllllUDism, it agreed to omit the term "communist" threat
ill the text o.r the treaty but reserved the right to .further

4etine the speci.fic United States view on this subject as
a ••Pl.l'ate "understanding of the United States." 10

P• 8•

9
.
New ~ Herald Tribune, September 5, 1954.
10
Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.1?.•

.£.U•,
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TbB work of the treaty conference took only two
4&Jl1

"'81

discounting the previous consultations in w·a shingManila, and other capitols of the interested powers,

and the Manila Treaty was signed on September 8, 1954. At
'1ae conclusion of the Manila Conference, Presi4ent Magsaysay

et the Philippines stated:
Through the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter,
we give assurance to our sister nations in Southeast
Asia that we do not seek to defend colonialism in
Asia but rather to liquidate it as speedily as
possible by methods or free consent.
Given these two assurances, the other free
states of Asia can find nothing objectiona~le to
the Manila Treaty and the Pacific Charter.
!his treaty, as a long-range defense structure, supported
and

welded by mutual economic and political understandings,

wa1 indeed an exceptional accomplishment when one considers
Ula diverse backgrounds and interests of the parties to
'1le

agreement.

11

'

SEA.TO: 1954•1964, Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza'1on, Bangkok, .February 1965, P• 8.

VI
ANALYSIS OF THE TREA..TY AND SEATO
The signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
treat 1 -~generally known as the Manila Treaty••marked the

i.eginning of an intimate association of Eastern and Western
powers concerned in the common defense of a vast Asian and
Pacific region.

In addition to the Treaty proper, the work

t the conference resulted in the signing of three second•

arJ documents, related to but not essential to the purpose

ot the Treaty.

They were entitled the "Understanding of
.

.

the United States," the "Protocol," and the ''Paci.fie
Charter."

1

These will be discussed briefly before an

anal1sis o.f the Treaty is undertaken.
The special "Understanding of the United States"
vaa insisted upon by Secretary of . State Dulles and it

..rel1 defined the special interest of the United States
in Communist aggression.

But in . the event o.f other ag-

aression or armed attack, it was prepared to consult under
the provisions of the Treaty.

This definition was made to

Placate many Congressm~n who .fe~ed that American . military
Power might become involved in local political or
\U&Si•colonial disputes.
1
see Appendix C for text of the Manila Treaty.
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The "Protocol'' to the Treaty designated the states

ot Ca.IDbodia, Laos, and the .free territory of Vietnam as
eligible for benefits under Article III and IV of the
These states were unable to participate as full

·-bers as a result of the Geneva Agreement.
The "Pacific Charter" was included at the suggestion
of President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines in order to

aak8 clear to the signatories that right of self determina"
tion of peoples would be guarded and "colonialism" in any
torm would not be promoted.
The Treaty itself suggests a "Monroe Doctrine" concept
et protection but implies much less of a commitment than

that declared in the North Atlantic Treaty where "an attack
on one equals an attack on all."

Dulles is reported to have

4eliberately planned this to avoid issues of constitutional
law when the treaty came up for ratification in the
nate.?

But President Eisenhower rs official commen.ts on

the signing of the Treaty were not nearly so specific in
t.tining ''aggre-ss·io~."

He stated, "The Treaty is designed

to promot~ security a~d peace in Southeast Asia and the
louthwestern Pacific by deterring Communist and other agll'ession in that area. • • n3

The Treaty provided in part

~l 2Ralph Briabanti, International Implication~ E1_ ~
tfo .! ta~ (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relans, 9~7), p. 18.
'1-eaid 3United States Congress, Senate, Message of the
ent, ~ Southeast !.!!.!.! Collective Defense Treat3 ~
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tor a
a111JJ11e

duplication of some commitments which had been
d by the United States and the Philippines under

'1Util' Treaty of 1951, and also, the oblig.a tions assumed
,

1

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States under the

&JZUS Treaty.

While the main theme of the Treaty related

'°military collective defense, there was also incorporated
ill the pact some provisions for trade, economic assistance,

pct cultural exchange programs.
Looked at from a broad perspective, the Manila Treaty
..bodied two essential military and political .features
which should be emphasized before a more thorough study and
examination of the provisions of the Treaty are made.
lirst, the agreements were a means of putting on a permanent
-.Sis the staff consultations that had beeD held between

acme members as a result of bilateral defense arrangements.
!he Treaty served as a permanent .framework .for the continua-

'1.on of these military contacts on a regular basis and
defined which threats to mutual security would arouse

organized military response by the signatory powers.

The

military provisions offered protection to the small non•sig•
...tory countries in the area which might request such aid,
1114 might otherwise be defenseless against threat of
l,ggl'ession.

The second broad feature of the Treaty was the

bi9~~Dl)ber
.!J'otocol Thereto, Executive K, The White House,
10, 1954 . (Washington: Government Printing Office,
..... ' p. 2.
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·cal arrangement for aligning the nations or Southeast
pol it 1
'ormally on the side of the United States on matters
Asia .a.
-1111111on interest in the area.

ot

Ov--

In his message, President Eisenhower also emphasized
.'1af.t the "Treaty calls for economic cooperation to enable
~

tree countries of this area to gain strength and vigor

ot only militarily, but also socially and economically."
!he main body of the Treaty, however, relates to the

ailitary security aspects of the Treaty area and these

are very clearly defined.
The Preamble of the Treaty set forth the spirit
and purpose of the Treaty.

It recognized the sovereign

equality of all the parties and reiterated their faith in
'118 Charter of the United Nations and defined the legality

ot this Treaty under Article

51

of that charter which

permits individual and collective de.fense.

This Treaty,

it stated, was directed against no government, no nations

Uld against no peoples.
Article I reiterated the resolve of all the parties
to rea.t'firm their solemn obligations under the Charter of
the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any inter•
a&tional disputes in which they may be involved, and to
~•train in their international relations from the threat or

llle or force inconsistent with the purposes of the United
lations.

i

92
Article II contained the principle of the earlier
faJ!denberg resolution, which required that collective
iecuritY pacts entered into by the United States must be

..,,ed on

continuous self-help and mutual aid.

The parties

pJ.edged themselves by such means not only to maintain and
•eveloP their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack but also to prevent and counter subversive

aotivities directed from without.

The Treaty thus

eaph•sized the danger of subversion and indirect aggression.4
Article III declared that sound economies and tree
!aatitutions were essential in maintaining internal peace
Uld security.

It recognized that Communism breeds on

poverty, and that nations might be able to develop their
internal stability through economic cooperation.

Secretary

Dalles pointed out that this article created no economic

walls against nations in the region which did not partici•
pate in the Treaty but did offer a special relationship
\o the member states.

Nor did Article III preclude United

tates• aid to non-member nations when their economic

1trength and stability contributed to the stability of the
area.5

4· .. .

Ibid., p. 3.

let
-

SU~ited States Senate, The Southeast Asia Collective
ense Treatl, p. 4.

-
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The collective security objectives of the Treaty
. .I'.

two-fold.

One is implied in the Protocol to the

This made it possible for the designated Protocol

,,ates to appeal for assistance in case of violation of
tbe Geneva Agreement and would thus help to stabilize the

area as a whole.

Another i 's f'ound in Article IV which was

deiigned to avert acts of aggression or subversion.

This

article, described by Dulles as the most important of the
!reaty, contained three sections. 6 Section I defined
..aaures to be taken against overt aggression and provided

tor certain non-signatory states to be included in the pro•
'9ct1on of the Treaty, under specific conditions.

Section

II described the obligations of member states pursuant to
Ule measures to be taken against

s~bversion,

while Section

III described the duties of member states in assisting the

4eaignated states in ease of aggression.
The non-signatory states referred to in Section I

were Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

Associate member-

lbip was broached for these "Protocol" states by the
••bers, particularly the United States, which regarded the

••aae fire in Indo-China as a major Connnunist achievement
Uld recognation of certain Communist control in Southeast

-·

6Ibid ..
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7 The neutralization of Laos and Cambodia had been

Asia•

the Geneva Agreement.

part o f

Many Americans feared that

t)lis might embolden those who hoped to bring these states
der ruture Communist influence and control and thus con911
i•i "1te a threat to the Treaty area. Since the Manila

treatJ: resulted mainly f .rom the crisis in Indo-China, the
ieeurity of these states was of great importance to
Southeast Asia.
To facilitate implementation of the Treaty, Article
y provided for a Council of the member nations.

This

oom::ac!l would provide for consultation regarding military
ua4 other planning as the situation in the area might

re,uire.

It was this article that gave authority for the

permanent Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Article VI reminded the parties of ' their obligations
•o the United Nations Charter.

Each member declared that

it vas party to no international arrangements in conflict
with the United Nations and that it would not in the
hture undertake such arrangements.
Article VII made it clear that not all nations which

••re interested

in the Treaty or might benefit from it were

able to become members, and this provision would make it
0 ••ible

(Lo d
11

for them to accede to membership at some future

7 J • H. Brimmell, Commun.ism in South East Asia

on:

Oxford University . Press,l9S9), . p:-2'1:J4~
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This would require, however, the unanimous consent

et the members.

....

Article VIII described the "Treaty area" as the

ral area of Southeast Asia, including the entire

territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of

Uae SouthWest Pacific not including the Pacific area north

ot twenty-one degrees thirty minutes north latitude.
Article IX merely assigned the Republic of the
Pldlippines as the official depositary of the Treaty while
A:rticle X and XI covered technical aspects of the duration

et

the Treaty, procedures for withdrawal Qf membership,

aa4 agreement on the language of the Treaty texts.

The

!J'eat1 was to continue indefinitely.
It is significamt that the Treaty commitments of

'1le United States included defense of part of the mainland

et Southeast Asia, since the United States has been tradi•
tionally shy of military involvement in this area.

It

•• also the first time that Australia and New Zealand had
P&l'ticipated in treaty arrangements in Southeast Asia,
Ut•ide of previous empire commitments.

New Guinea, Timor,

ladonesia, and Burma belonged to the Treaty area.

Though

.. t being members, their .governments ~ight nevertheless re, ...t protection which would be accorded if the signatory
lleabers agreed.

The Treaty could be applied in the case of

louth Vietnam, C~bodla, and Laos only "at the invitation
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., tri th the consent or th.a government cone erned.." 8

The wording or the commitments against external
a•taok in Article 'IV differed from that of the North Atiaatic Treaty both in purpose and spfrit.

Rather than

•• •attack on one is an attack on all" concept, this
.a.r•icle stated more moderately that "aggression by means

et armed attack in the Treaty area against any or the
parties • • • endangers its own peace and safety," and
each government would "act to meet tlile common danger in
aecordance with its

co~s~itutional

proeesses."9

Article

If likewise stated that the parties to the Treaty must

eon111lt together to devise methods against subversion,
111dl• consultation prior to action against external attack
•• not required al 1lli.@ugh coordinated·efforts were implied.
Interpretation of this Article IV led to long debate
t.ring the Congressional hearings on ratification of the
!reat7.

Hamilton Fish, as president of the American

Pelitical· Action Committee, pleaded that the real danger
t 'this provision was that the United States government

Oould now make war without a declaration or war, and might
feel duty bound to react in a military way to any Chinese
91'

other Communist provocation.

He did not feel that

A.!'ticle IV, as presented, could definitely avoid dual

Coll . 8Department of State, Bulletin, "The Southeast Asia
1954,)ctive Defense . Treaty," Vol • . XXI, No. 795, 20 (September
' Art. IV, Se et. 3. .
.
9
Ibid., Art. IV, Sect. 1.
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10

The rather loose interpretation that
illterpre ta ti on•
ld be given to this section of the Treaty was made

0011

eYident in 1962 during the crisis in Laos.

Eager to

reassure its ally, the United States declared that any
aotioD in meeting an armed attack by Communist forces did

•not depend upon prior agreement ot all parties to the
!l'eatf, since this treaty obligation is individual as
.. 11
well as collective.
And again in Dullest report to the Senate, men•

•toned above, he stated that no material Changes in military
planning were required since we were "maintaining at all

'illes power.ful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific
eapable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places
ot our choosing. '112

This too could suggest independent

interpretations of ,a ct.i on in non-member states rather than

1.
'

I

eonsultations and collective determinations as required by
the Treaty.

Action against subversion and overt military

attack, when carried out simultaneously, could render
Article IV•s provisions against subversion somewhat ambiguous.

I

10

,I

.

United States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before
hCllllllittee on Foreign Relations, The Southeast ~ Collective
Ji:tens! Treaty, January 19, 195~ashington: Government
inting . Office, 1955), p. 43.
1
b
1nepartment of State Bulletin, Vol. 46, "Statement
Dean Rusk and Thanat Khoman," HO 11671 ('Washington:
OTernnient Printing Office, 1962), P• 498.

rl

cOllai

l2united

-

States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before
ttee on Foreign Relations, ~· ~., p. 6.
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yer• i

no action should be taken against attack or subon on a non•member state except at the invitation of

'1Jl.t state, the Treaty powers might face a difficult

problem. As a result of a successful coup d'etat, the
].egallY constituted state would no longer exist and no
!DYitation for intervention could legally evolve.

This

oould be a real dilemma under the Treaty and would have to
be anticipated in an area where the coup d'etat is not
iJltrequently employed.

These risks of possible misinter-

pretation did exist but it was decided that the danger of
th:!a could hardly be worse than inaction.

Dulles had

declared earlier that collective action might .have risks,
·~t

these risks are far less than would face us in a few

rears from now if we dare not be resolute today."

13

The Council, established under provision of Article
V of the Treaty, was granted only broad general outlines of
&•thority.

In fact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SIA.TO) itself became an organization as a result of Council
aotion and was not inherently provided for in the Treaty.
'1'he Bangkok Conference, held in the Thai capital F~bruary

23·25, 1955, involved an epochal development in American
foreign policy with respect to Southeast Asia.

It not only

llarked the first meeting of the Council created by the
13Norman A,. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition (New
York: McGraw-Hill,
1961), p.-Z-95.
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!;reaty, but also founded the structtll'e for SEA.,TO which was

.

14

to iJllplement the spirit and provisions of the Manila Treaty.
The SEATO Council which consists of the Foreign
Ministers of the eight member countries and meets annually,
iets the

broad~, ,

common policies required for the fulfillment

ot the objectives of the Treaty. Each Foreign Minister
represents his country and each has an equal voice in the
proceedings. All decisions are unanimous. 15 The Bangkok
conterence first set up a Permanent Council of Representatives which was to meet at .SEA.TO Headquarters, at least
once a month.

The selection of Bangkok as the permanent

headquarters of SEATO was a very logical choice.

Although

both Singapore and Manila put up strong arguments in favor

ot these two sites, emphasizing the excellent technical
facilities and communications systems already available,
both were rejected for sensitive political reasons.
Singapore, being a Crown Colony, and representing a system
repugnant to most of the newly independent states of Asia,
OOuld not be seriously considered.

Likewise, Manila was

1 4nep~~tment of State, The Bangkok Conference of the
.
11
~ Powers, Publication 5909';-Ser. II, Far Eastern~ --lV&iliington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), P• 1.

l5orrice of Public Information, SEATO REPORT, 1954Southeast .Asia Treaty Organization Hea<rq~ers, 1959), P• 14.
.

1
lli9
(Bangkok:

il
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~egarded

as too much on the periphery of the area and

too closely oriented with the United States to
possib 11
otter a good neutral background for the participating powers.
!h&iland, however, was part of the Asian land mass, and
]l.eadquarters in Bangkok would reflect the faith of its plan•
ners in the permanence of the area.

With the SEATO Military

headquarters in close proximity to the areas of' possible
comnunist aggression, such presence might act as a deter•
rent to any rash action on the part of' Communist China, and
would serve as a political stabilizing influence within
16
!hailand as well.
In addition to this Permanent Council, a Military

.lclvisory Group was formed, compmsed of a military member
each from the signatory states, for the purpose of making
reco:rmnendations G>n military matters to the Council and to
paraue the implementation of recommendations approved by
'he Permanent Council.

This group established a planning

office in Bangkok for training facilities in Thailand and
'1utoughout the Treaty area.

A Secretariat....Qeneral was

established to support and coordinate the non-military
work of the organization.

Its head, the Secretary-General,

vaa to be the chief permanent official 0f SEATO and the
lpokesman for the organization.
lh_

..

~Modelski,

Other committees and

22• .£.!1., P• 107.
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••0

t

ions were created to ca:rry out the special purposes of

- · Manila Treaty.

~e

Central Service Office was to deal

1fith ad.Dlinistrative and financial matters pertaining to

'118 organization.

The Cultural Relations Office was

eJPeoted to encourage the strengthening of the members•
eultural heritage through use of grants, exchange scholaraldps, and traveling lectureships.

The Economic Services

ottice was given the broad function of collecting informa'1on on current economic development and problems, and

I

eoonomic activities of the Communist bl0c, especially in
'1ae !reaty a:rea. 1 7

On the basis of the information gathered

bJ the Office's own resea:rch and other sources, studies were

'° be prepared on the

specific economic questions for the

oonsideration of a Committee of Economic Experts and the
Oouncil representatives.

Another .function was to make

periodic reports on actions in the economic field taken by

Ule member governments to ca:rry out recommendations of the
llA.!O Council.

11

The program for economic cooperation and the improve•

..nt of social conditions was provided for in Article I I I
ot the Treaty.

II,

Here, technical assistance was specifically

..Dtioned in pro~oting economic progress which would con'1-ibute to internal and collective efforts of governments.

l7SEA.TO REPORT, 1954..1959, .!m•

ill•1

P• 19.

I
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fl1e pacific Charter also affirmed the intention ot the

gnatories to ''continue to cooperate in the economic,
11
iocial and cultural field in order to promote higher living
itandards, economic progress and social well being in the
region.''

Although it was not clear at the time the Treaty

aad Charter were signed whether it was intended to imple..nt these proposals through an organization created
.,ecitically for this purpose under the Treaty, or whether
agencies already existing in the area would be used, this
,uestion was explored at the Bangkok Conference and resolved
accordingly.

Rather than set up administration of foreign

aid which might duplicate efforts and programs already
..derway, it was decided that existing arrangements for aid
lhould continue and that additional aid under the Manila
treaty should be confined to compensation for military aid
and other expenditures incurred in connection with the

treaty itself.

Programs already in existence referred to

the vast bilateral aid programs supported by the United
l'ates, the Columbo Plan, United Nations agencies such as
mJAFE, and the World Baruc.
The foreign aid planning of the United States had
kllpt in mind the danger of economic under•development and
the accompanying stress which might invite Communist schemes
tor retorm.

There was no certainty that a country would

•ot tuiwn to Communism even though, possibly with Western

103
it was making good progress in raising living stan-

)181p,

cla!'dS·

But there was a real danger that a country which

found itself frustrated in its social and economic aims would
t;ar'!l

to Communism in despair.

The chances that a country

would be encouraged to preserve a system of social and
political freedom were certainly much better if it were
1J1proving and raising the standard of living of its
oitizens.

Where living

~tandards

were not raised, unrest

and agitation could quickly invite change.

The measure of

economic improvement was entirely relative.

In Southeast

Aiia, where economies were based largely on agriculture,
the scope and cost of a program to render improvement was
mach less than that for a country of similar size in Europe
which had advanced to a greater degree of industrialization.
!he encouragement of land reform schemes, improved methods

et cultivation, increased access to markets through better
~ansportation

~uilding,

systems, irrigation projects, canals, road

and electrification of rural areas, would greatly

increase living standards.

The American foreign.aid pro-

grams began as early as 1942 in the Latin American countries,
lnit the first ambitious effort followed President Truman's

Inaugural appeal to make the ben~fits of scientific advances
llld industrial progress available for the improvement and
ll'ovth or under-developed areas.

From a modest beginning

ot 35 million dollars in 1950, the American foreign aid
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"""'ams to Southeast Asia exceeded 8 billion dollars by

proo1958.

Under pressure or the Korean and Indo-China wars,

'11• essentially economic objectives of foreign aid gave
to assistance related more closely to political and
18
ailitarY requirements.
The stated purpose of the Mutual

,,.1

aeourity Act of 1951 was to
• •• maintain the security and to promote the
toreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance
to triendly countries and to strengthen the
national security and indiiidual and collective
defense of the free world. 9
!he original good intentions or purely economic assistance

was perforce altered to meet the military threats during
tihis period.
)&ad

By January of 1954, Sec.r etary or State Dulles

to admit that foreign aid was being

limite~

to situa•

'ions where it clearly contributed to military strength,
11pecially in Vietnam.

There was some early hesitation on

\he part of.'the United Kingdom to accept this diversion to

llilitary aid since British emphasis at the first Bangkok
Conterence was on the economic rather than military objec'ives ot the Treaty.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony

Iden hoped it . would ". • • promote economic well-being and
18.Amos A. ~Jordan, ''U. s. Foreign Assistance in
:OUtheast Asia," in William Henderson (ed.), Problems of
-· ~. Polic;y:; (Cambridge: The. M.I.T. Press, ., 1963), P• 213.
19 ..
King, .fU?• £ii•~ p. 156:
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••yelopment • • •

We should all know by now that a .f'ree

IJlcl prosperous people is Communism 1 s most formidable f'oe. "

20

ID answer to the question on the purpose of aid to Southeast

A•ia, the Clay Committee replied that if this assistance
itrengthened the will and capacity of' a country to remain
independent and helped it move toward political and economic
atability, our money would have been wisely spent. 21

The

1J1lited States' bilateral assistance under the Manila Treaty
1ft.I

undertaken with this purpose in mind in most instances.

BJ doing so, it helped these regions achieve an impn>vement
1D both economic and political posture.
Other aspects of foreign aid took more specific

forms.

The securing of' bases for military purposes of' SEA.TO

4etense required large capital outlays which were beneficial
to the countries involved.

In some cases, offers of aid

were extended to preclude orfers of aid from Communist
1oarces.

The Russian and Chinese Communist governments

lla.Te always been disturbed by this successful venture into
4eTelopment of the nations or Southeast Asia, and they have
•ollght to picture ulterior motives behind Western moves.

!he1 usually described such foreign aid as a scheme to

!li.,

2 0nepartment of State,

p. 25.
21

Jordan' .2.E.•

m.'

!h2 Bangkok Conference,__g;e.

p. 214.
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resume the old colo.n ial positions in Southeast Asia.

A

t1Pical charge was that:
American businessmen and politicians, placing
little reliance on doctrines and theories, preferred to conduct their shady business with the
coun.tries in the name of their allies and under
the auspices of international organization. This
happened in South Vietna..~ when the U.S.A. 'imperceptibly' supplanted France.22
1x:penditures in good will, communications, medicine,
education, and cultural exchanges, likewise required heavy
capital outlays.

The use of funds in precluaive purchasing

to deny strategic materials to the Communist bloc entailed
large hidden expenditures.

These were all economic measures

pertinent to American implementation of Article III of the
!reaty.

But they were small measures in comparison to

the overall military assistance given in support of
indigenous armed forces.

In a.v aluating the potential

economic benefit of some of these so-called military
expenditures, it can be seen that many projects had dual
Talue.

The same roads

construct~ d

for the military in the

north of Thailand could also be used for hauling teak or
•olt:ram to the port of Bangkok for export.

The new vast

telecommunication systems served both the military and
oivilian needs, even though the cost was charged as a
llilitary expense.

Too, the establishment of military air

bases throughout the Treaty area has created a · fine net-work
22

ln ..
-Y. · Konovalov, "The Tentacles of Bases Strategy,"
....,ternational Ai'fairs, Vol. 7 (Moscow: July 1963). p. 56.
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rnmercial air-strips which can be used concurrently.

at c O

II

leW military power stations have a capacity and permanency
to meet civil requirements of large areas for years to

oome.23
Implementation of the economic provisions of the
freaty were an important task of the first meeting of the
council at Bangkok, but the creation of the military organ
to maintain the collective defense of the Treaty area was

a much more complicated undertaking.

The military commit-

aents of the Treaty were carefully spelled out.

It was

tally agreed, for example, that in the event of an attempted
Communist conquest of Thailand, the members would be com•
llitted to fight and must be willing and able to fight.

The

aethod of meeting such an attempted conquest would depend
on its nature, the area of attack, and the type of terrain
involved in the immediate theater of the attack.

Consequent-

17, the type of threats possible in the Treaty area should
be examined before analyzing the military provisions of the
!reaty.
By its geographical nature and configuration, the
ll'ea did not lend itself to the deployment of mass armies.

4

3i'Pa~tners in Progress," SEATO REPORT (Bangkok:
0 Headquarters, 1962), p. 7.
24
p.
• Royal Institute of International Affairs, .Q.E.• ~.,
158
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oads, heavy jungle, monsoon weather cycles, and an
f oor r
alJlost purely agrarian economic base for supply, contributed
little to the support of modern land forces.

The logistic

requirements per man in the modern Western army was many
tiJJleS that of the Communist Asian counterpart, as was reyealed in World War II and the Korean War.

From a political

point of view, the traditional dislike of foreign garrisons

ill Asian countrysides, the inevitable incidents between
ailitary and local citizens, the differences in the
political and social philosophies of the membe.r nations,
all made the question of permanent foreign garrisons
impractical.
Because of the long distances involved .from the
Asian mainland to the Philippines or Australia and the vast
amount of material necessary, it could be assumed that an
crtert attack would not take the form of an amphibious
operation, although submarine and mine warfare was a limited
possibility.

I

:

'I

Chances of air attacks were more to be reckoned

with, but these would hardly assume dangerous proportions
11Dless they came as a prelude to invasion.

'JP• of attack would

The remaining

take the form of either a mass land

invasion or concerted guerilla operations.

Among member

nations, only Pakistan had a common border with China and
1

this was 200 miles of mountain barrier.

An attack against

!ha.iland or East Pakistan would perforce violate the

I

109
ality of Burma and India, and any other theater of
ueutr
.
aggression would have to be directed against Laos, Cambodia,
and south Vietnam.

The decision not to maintain large

perJD8.Ilent garrisons in static posture in the treaty area
•as first set forth by Secretary Dulles at the Bangkok
Council meeting in 1955. 2 5 Instead, the main strength would

rest with mobile strategic forces of great sea and air

power which could strike swiftly wherever the need arose.
!his massive retaliation force would be able to utilize
most of the United States strategic bases from the Aleutians

to the Philippines.

In addition to this heavy mobile force,

each partner would be expected to supply ground forces, and
the United Kingdom and the United States would make the

aajor naval contributions.

Among Western forces would be

the nearly 45,000 .Americans based at Okinawa, and the 28th
Commonwealth Brigade plus the supporting air units available
1n Malaya. 2 6 Air power would contain groups from the Asian
aambers as well.

Mobility and massive striking power was

to be the basis for all defense doctrine.

Arthur H. Dean,

the former special Ambassador to Korea , in 1953•1954,

declared,
2 5The Bangkok Conference,
26 '

Bl
.....22

.!n2

. .

.

..

...

.Q.E.•

..

~., P• 5.
..

The Institute for Strategic Studiesf !h2 Communist
the Western Alliances (London, 1963J, . p. 22.
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We ought not to scatter our power into show pieces
of ineffective size by establishing substantial
stationary United States forces in forward areas,
since our military establishment is relatively
small compared with the extent of the territory
to be protected.27
Specific commitments to the SEATO military establish.,nt by the member states was to be determined by the
nature of their forces, and their geographical proximity
to threatened areas.

This applied as well to air and naval

torces permanently assigned to SEATO :f"unction.
obligations became a great part of the
training and service activities.

u. s.

These SEATO

Seventh Fleet's

Great Britain was main-

taining a substantial Asiatic force, spread from her
1trategic commitments in the Middle East to Hong Kong.
Australian air and sea participation was also substantial.
The SEATO garrison in Thailand was to be manned by local

troops.

The bulk of the massive retaliation striking force

rested with the United States.

There were also Military

.lasistance Advisory Groups and supporting troops stationed
throughout the Treaty area, but the main American combat
llllits remained in the Korean, Hawaiian, and Okinawan areas,
outside of thos~ employed in South Vietnam.

The 13th Air

Poree, stationed in the Philippines at Clark Field bad .full
IWeep or Southeast Asia and was within easy striking

4a

2
" . 7.A;thur H. Dean, "Collective Defense in Southeast
ia, Current Historx, Vol. 31, No. 179, July 1956, p. 8.
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clistanoe.28

Under the Security Section of SEATO, a train•

iJ1S program to combat subversion was set up, using
ailitarY and constabulary forces of the member nations.
SEATO joint planning and training programs, both
ailitary and civil, were an active and essential part of

tb8 organization from the start.

Member nations, especially

Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand all experienced a
lhortage of skilled workers in the industries and shops
that were to ' supp·o rt the organization.
SBATO Skilled Labour Project which

The outcome was the

suppleme~ted

the efforts

ot the governments of these countries to increase their
1upply of trained manpower.

Besides various technical

1chools established in the Treaty areas, a SEATO Graduate
School of Engineering at Bangkok provided a

or

two~year

course

advanced instruction leading to a master's degree in

1tructural, hydraulic, transportation or public health
engineering. 29

A SEA.TO Military Technical Training School

in Bangkok provided a three-year training course for the
future technical supervisors, foremen, skilled workmen and
instructors of the Royal Thai Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
Meteorological teleconnnunieations projects were also set up

28James E. King, "Collective Defense: The Military
~ODlllitment," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the
0
- ld War (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins .. Press, 190S9), p. -1'29.-:. 29SEATO: 1954•196k, .22• £.!j?,., P• 9.
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:lD !bailand and the Philippines, as well as medical
· arch laboratories.

res e

The military training programs began soon after the
tounding of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

As

earlJ as 1956, SEATO undertook its first joint military
aoeuver named "Operation Firm Link" in which all members
participate~

in .a mock airborne operation against a simu-

lated attack in northern Thailand.30

••e ot amphibious,

The operation employed

paratroop, air, naval, and ground forces.

!bis exercise was the first ot a long series of joint
problems of this type to be conducted regularly throughout

the Treaty region since its inception.
va1 ta:r

The tirst maneuver

from a real success, but it did serve to emphasize

the weaknesses inherent in any operation of this type,

~

I

eaploying multi-lingual elements with diverse training
backgrounds.
necessary.3 1

Standardization of procedures would be very
The areas used for these exercises changed

regularly to better acquaint the SEA.TO members with their
Tarioua theaters of operation.

Operation "Saddle Up"

invaded North Borneo and this was followed by exercise
•hlungan'' carried out by amphibious :forces against a

) . JOSEATO Record,
1956 , p. 8. '

Vo~. 1 (Bangkok:

SEA.TO Headquarters,

31 "seato, '' Deadline Data on World Affairs, Augustllll'ch 1962, p. 3.
-

~
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l')dlippine shore.

Of these many practice maneuvers carried

out each year, a specific type of military operation was
attempted, to acquaint these forces with operations they
Jligbt encounter in case of a military aggression in the
!19eat1 area.

4oo

Operation ''Tulungan," held in 1962, employed
.

.

aircraft, 78 naval ships, and 37,000 men.

The planning

and study involved in. such 0perations required close team
work and coordination and this was made possible through the
Jlilitary Planning Office of the Organization.

In a recent

report on SEATO, the Secretary-General, Pote Sarasin, drew
attention to the military exercises held during the past

I

1ears which he said,

'i

developed from relatively simple demonstrations of
coordinated movement, into highly complicated
maneuvers lhich tax and develop skill of the
members' armed forces in combined action.32

\

I

!he political and military problems faced by these member
nations were shared to some extent by non•member states as
well and SEA.TO's success has evinced considerable interest
'1atoughout Asia.

In 1959, for example, both Burma and

Indonesia dispatc~d observers to the SEATO military exercises in Thailand.

Besides military preparedness, their

interest ~as focused, as well, on the economic and technical
developments of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
32

,.
Pote Sarasin, Secretary-General, Report .2B Seato,
~2-196,J (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters), p. 12;
lftL

'11 1
11

'I

I
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such a complex, coordinated military structure had

no t

been maintained over this vast area since World War II.

!hB success:Cul growth of the organization .from the early

}lopes of the first Council meeting at Bangkok to the present
zietlected the concern that the member powers held regarding
possible Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.33

3JModelski,

..QJ2•

~., p. 8.

l1

I

j
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VII
CHALLENGES TO SEATO
Before any evaluation of SEAT0 1 s usefulness can be
attempted, there must be a review or the political and
ailitary crises that have developed in the Treaty area
since
, 0

1954 and the challenges that these events have posed

the Manila Treaty powers.

A·s anticipated by Secretary

ot State Dulles, the most serious breaches of peace have
occurred in the ''Protocol" states of Laos and South Vietnam
which were not eligible for full membership in the Treaty
due to the Geneva Agreement, but which Dulles hoped might
be given some "mantle of protection."

1

In the case or

Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao have attempted a series of
illaurgencies aimed at the overthrow or the Royal Government.

A similar rebellion in South Vietnam, led by the

Communist Vietcong, an integral part of North Vietnam's
Lao Dong Party has resulted in very heavy military operations
Which could engulf the Treaty powers in a major war.

Commu-

nist Chinese and Soviet . support or this rebellion has been
quite open, as will be seen, but the Manila Treaty powers
have had to exercise great restraint in their reactions to
&Toid charges of ureckless interference'' in the internal
l.ttairs of these states, despite requests from the states
l

.

Q.

a.

Daily Wireless Bulletin, September

7, 1954.
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When SEATO was created, China had already become
tormallY allied with the Soviet Union in a Treaty of FriendtbiPi Alliance, and Mutual Assistance dated February 19$0.

fbis Treaty joined these Communist powers against a reiurgence of Japanese militarism and for the purpose of
.rurthering their mutual interests in the economic well-being
. 2
and peace of Asia.

The Chinese Communist Party made early

etrorts to assert its ideological independence from the
soviet Union and this was soon made evident by China's
participation with Communist leadership in Southeast Asia
and its support of other Asian Communist movements.

Not

wishing to become subservient to the Soviet Union, and

finding themselves frequently at odds with Soviet policy on
such matters as Hungary and Albania, the Chinese have taken
a more active independent part in the Communist movement
1n Asia.

Following the Chinese disengagement in Korea,

heavy logistic commitments went to the extension or military
aupport to the Vietminh in Indo-China which ultimately led
to the political settlement of the Indo•China war at Geneva
in 1954.3
2· .

The spread of Communism into northern Vietnam
..

Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in tne Far East (London:
VA.Lord University Press, !953), p.~6~

n-.

Oxt

3J. H. Brimmel, Communism in Southeast~ (London:

o:rd University Press, .1959), . p~259. · · · · · ·
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the Peoples Republic of China the opportunity to
ga.,e
extend its influence through the support of expanded
Vietminh activities in southern Vietnam and the strengthening of the Pathet Lao dissident forces in northern Laos.
The political turmoil that has existed in Laos
since World War II resulted mainly from the struggle for
power between a few elite political factions, two of which
were led by rival half-brothers, Prince Souphanouvong and
Prince Souvanna Phouma.

These groups had their origin in

the strong anti-colonial movements which prevailed prior to

World War II and they were strengthened by a period of
semi-political autonomy during the Japanese occupation.
The Pathet Lao, under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong,

strongly opposed the re-establishment of French presence
in Laos after Japan ts def'eat and turned to the Vietminh for
support, both political and military.4

Using Thailand as

a base (and not without sympathetic Thai support),
Souphanouvong organized his "Resistance Government" and by

1952 succeeded in securing p~litical control over two of
the remote northeastern provinces of Laos bordering Tongking

in North Vietnam.

At about this time his activities in

'l'ba.iland were curtailed by the Thai government after evidence
was uncovered that this same group had tried to incite

4

.

Butwell, .21?.•

~.,

p. 131.
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Laotians in Thailand to agitate for an autonomous Lao
province in ~ortheast Thailand.5

During July of 1955,

fighting erupted between the Communist oriented Pathet Lao
torces and the Royal government troops in northern Laos
despite the Geneva accord, and the presence of the International Control Commission.

At this time an attempt was

made by Thailand to have the Manila Treaty powers formally
declare thei.r concern over this matter, indicating both
SEATO jurisdiction and SEATO unity.

But, for the first

time, Britain and France vetoed the resolution and suggested

that the International Control Commission merely be notitied that the situation was reviewed.

The Soviet press

made a propaganda issue of SEATO disagreements and spoke

ot the
deepening crisis which has beset the principal
aggressive grouping in Southeast Asia, the
United States' sponsored SEATO bloc. Britain
and particularly France have . not expressed any 6
desire to participate in SEATO "join" actions.

In 1957 the Royal Laotian government arrived at a settlement
with the Pathet Lao.

The two northeast provinces were

5nuring a talk with Prince Souphanouvong at Bangkok
~n 1951, he complained to the writer that Laotian refugees
~~-the Udon district of northeast Thailand were being
.u.cu-shly treated by the Thai police . and many of these
Laotians were anxious to return to north Laos if the Royal
gove~nment of Laos would give them safe conduct.
VIII

611

Washington's Asian Impasse,'' International Affairs,
(Moscow, 1962), 34.
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re-incorporated into the Laotian state, the armed forces
of Prince Souphanouvong were assimilated into the regular
Laotian army except for bis own elite political guards.
While SEATO played no direct role in the settlement, it did
.aintain contact with the Royal Laotian government.

During

the negotiations the United States, Britain, and France
issued a tripartite note affirming their interest in the
independence and unity of Laos.

This gave the Laotian

government the public support of the three major Western
powers in SEATO but did not commit the organization to any
other course.
Efforts of the International .C ontrol Commission to
investigate and e:xpose violations of the Geneva Agreement
were

continuo~sly

hampered by the veto power of the Polish

commissioner against the Indian and Canadian members.

Laos

again became the focus of world attention in 1959 when
another flare-up took place between re"grouped Pathet Lao
and government forces.

T~e ·

Secretary-General of SEATO im"

J18diately declared the matter entirely a Laotian internal
attair and that SEATO would remain outside this conflict.

!he United Nations Security Council expressed concern over

the Laotian situation as early as 1959. At that time,
!ha.iland notif'ied the Council of border violations in her
northeast provinces when fighting had erupted in that area
facing Laos.

Although Russia protested the implication that

120
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Pathet Lao were supported by forces of North Vietnam,

tb9 United Nations agreed to investigate the matter.7

Speaking of this Laotian incident before the Supreme
Soviet in October 19.59, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev stated,
Given a reasonable approach and adherence to
international agreements, the skirmishes which are
taking place th.ere can be ended and the situation
normalized. The important thing is that the Great
Powers should not interfere in the internal affairs
of other coungries or else there may be undesirable
consequences.
In late 19.59 and early 1960, the Pathet Lao,

supported by a Soviet airlift of military supplies, regained control of much of northern Laos as well as areas
in the south bordering on. South Vietnam.

The effect of

this Soviet aid which was sent from North Vietnam was to
pat the Pathet Lao in a position of unprecedented strength. 9
!he Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same time
announced that his government was considering an appeal

to SEATO under Article IV of the Manila Treaty.

The SEA.TO

Council responded by announcing its "grave concern" over the
continued offensive of the Pathet Lao rebels.

The Council

7nR~qu~~t of Thailand for Assistance Under the
Peace Observation Connnission," Yearbook of the United
•
-!tions,
19.59, p. 60.
- -

·Sic. u. Chernenko (ed.), Soviet Foreign Polic:,
~aic Acts and Documents of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,
~l~f1%'2(Moscow: Foreign Language PublishingHouse,, p. 90.
.
~odelski, .21?• ~., P• 13.
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rurther declared that if active military attempts to obtain
oontrol of Laos continued, members of SEATO were prepared
•

• within the terms of the Treaty, to take whatever
•
action may be appropriate in the circumstances.nlO As the

•

Laos situation assumed major crisis proportions, moves for
• cease-fire were offered to the Pathet Lao, and when they
retused, the Royal government appealed to SEATO members to
bring pressure to bear, the United States threatened unilateral action to preserve the integrity of Laos.

to the Pacific and marine helicopter crews into the northWith this adamant show of

intention, the Pathet Lao called for a cease•fire in May.
SBlTO had to decide whether to intervene in this internal

war, and it concluded reluctantly that it had to face such
a possibility.

It declared its readiness to do so in

guaranteeing the cease-fire in Laos.

The

~eneva

settlement

ot the Laotian question in 1962 guaranteed peace and
neutrality for Laos, but the Pathet Lao, supported by
Vietminh, acquired still more territory during 1962-1963
Ind have largely invalidated the position of Souvanna Phowna
1

.2'
'-~

oWi111~ Henderson (ed.), Southeast Asia: Problems
~ited States Policx (Cambridge: The M.I~Press, 1963),

o.

I

President

Kennedy appealed to the American people, moved new forces

east provinces of Thailand.

11

I
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he neutralist leader of the Geneva-sponsored coalition
as t

government•

11

A second and more serious challenge to peace and
stability in the Treaty area which constitutes a challenge

to SEATO as well, has been the Communist Viet-Cong threat
to south Vietnam.

or the many countries of Asia, Vietnam

is one of the few that can be considered basically a Sinic
culture, and has in fact been incorporated in China proper

during many periods of its long history.

Like the Thais,

the first Vietnamese migrated St!>Uthward from China centuries

ago.

During this period the Chinese had sought to extend

their control and influence over these migrated brethren,
but usually met resistance. 12 From the first Chinese
conquest until the French in turn gained control in the
nineteenth century, Vietnam's political relationship to
China had been one of a cautious and anxious n.e ighbor.
Before the French era, this studied caution was determined
largely by the strength of the Chinese government in power
at the time.

Even the late Manchu d111asty in the seventeenth

century imposed a tribute relationship on Indo..China and as

late as 1885 Vietnam rulers received investitur.e from Peking.
11

Ibid., P• 150.

12liarold

c.

Hinton, China's Relations with Burma and

!ietnam (New York: . Institute of Pacific RelatrO'iis), p. ~
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Although this direct subservience was ended with the French
occupation, the national and political development of these
people was strongly affected by Chinese influence.

I

Vietaam's

thousand year vassalage to China contributed several

I
I

historical traditions.
Despite the ethnic similarities, the Tongkingese in
the northern part of Vietnam have been extremely distrustful

ot the Chinese.

This has resulted in awkward relations

between the Communist parties of the two countries.

The

cultural sophistication and unusual discipline of the
northern Vietnamese gave them a superior attitude in their
dealings with the Chinese.

The memory of the early Mongol

invasions of the Thirteenth Century, followed later by
the Ming and Manchu forces, did not make the Nationalist
Chinese occupation of 'Tongking very pleasant after the
surrender of the Japanese in

1945.

Nguyen Ai Quoc, who took the name of Ho Chi Minh,
was released from a jail in South China in
urging of

u. s.

military authorities.

1944

at the

They hoped that

this known Communist leader would be able to form a core

ot resistance to the Japanese in Tongking and could serve

the OSS as well in developing contacts in Japanese held
territories.

In addition he was to form an indigenous

liberatiol'l movement, similar to the Free Thai movement led
by former Thai .Premier Pridi Panamyong.

That he succeeded

llUch beyond American expectations iB very evident today.

I
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There is an interesting parallel to this phenomenon in
'l'bB.iland, Malaya, and the Philippines where the so-called
"anti•fascist" forces of liberation during ·w orld War II
becaille the nuclei of Communist movements in these countries

tallowing the Japanese surrender.

By August of 1945 Ho

Cbi Minh's influence extended across most of the northern
districts of Tongking and down to the delta provinces of
South Vietnam.

The OSS was delighted with his success and

he was in very high favor with the first American contingents in Hanoi in 1945. 1 3
Contrary to American wishes, the French managed to
reestablish effective military and political control over
the southe.rm half of Vietnam with the assistance of a
British occupation force under General D. A. Gracey.

The

north was relieved of the Chinese Nationalist occupation
in late 1946 and Vietnam was unified with a promise of
independence within the French Union under

~peror

Bao Dai.

But failure of the French to carry out this promise set
otf bitter reactions thr.·oughout the country and a guerilla

warfare broke out in early 1947 which was to continue through
to the present day.
Prior to World War II, the old Indo-China Communist

Party was an offshoot of the French Communist Party and

·13 . ...

~.,

p.

17.
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)ll8.intained a close association with the Soviet CoDlI1lunist

FartY as well.

But under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh

attar the Japanese War, this party became more closely
associated, geographically and ideologically, with the

cbinese Communist Party.

Problems peculiar to Asia and

the close similarity of the agricultural and industrial
development of the two states made this orientation rather
logical.

In 1951 the Indo-China Communist Party was trans•

rormed and took the title of the Vietnamese Workers Part
or Lao Dong.

In addition to Marx and Lenin, the teachings

and theories of Mao Tse-tung were adapted for party
direction. 14 This new party aimed for international
solidarity with the people of Cambodia, Laos, the Soviet
Union, China, and all Peoples democracies.

Ho Chi Minh

became President and Vo Nguyen Giap its military commander.
In structure the party took the Chinese rather than Soviet
torm and this reorganization formally broke French CoDllllunist Party controi.15

Like the Chinese Party, the Lao Dong

provided tor a broad base of support through various .front
organizations.
Following the French defeat and the Geneva Agreement
in

1954, Chinese influence and activity in the Lao Dong was
14s~r~~d B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York:
Institute of Pacific Relat1ons,-r9;6), .p. 36.
1 5Brimmell, .2.E• ~., p. 296.
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greatly stepped up as well as Chinese participation in the
economic strengthening of the new Peoples Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The leading role played by Communist

china during the Geneva Conference paved the way for greater
cbinese influence in North Vietnam.

In

1955

the Vietminh

made further changes in the party structure in order to
create a greater appeal to nationalist opinion in South
Vietnam and to enhance the Party's respectability in Asian
, 1es.

Tl:µs resulted in separating the functions of the

Party chief, Ho Chi Minh, and the political leadership,
Premier Pham Van Dong.

In September

1955,

I

the third

I

congress of the Lien Viet Fatherland Front declared that
I~

lorth Vietnamese regarded the division of Vietnam. as merely
a temporary measure until sufficient time .and indoctrination
prepared the south for acceptance of Communist leadership
in a unified Vietnam.. This was to be accomplished by
•tree" elections. 16 In the summer of 1955 Ho Chi Minh made

an official visit to Peking and on July 7 signed a SinoVietnamese communique with Chou En-lai in which they warned

the United States and the other Treaty powers against impleaenting the "designated" states portions of the Manila
Pact.

The same communique announced that China would grant

lorth Vietnam 800 million Chinese Yuan for rehabilitation

Summarw of World Broadcasts, Vol. V, No. 494
(1955)' l6BBC
34. '
L -

L
1

1

.1 1!

II

127

and would greatly expand the technical cooperation between
tbe two nations. · In addition, the North Vietnamese would
send cadres to China for training and the Chinese would
send technical and military advisory missions to North
Vietnam•

17

After the appearance of a new political strong-man
in south Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, the Lao Dong 1 s ambition to
win over early support of nationalist sentiments in South
Vietnam came to an end.

With American support, Diem quickly

aroused a strong political following in the south.

This

American support took the form of heavy outlays in foreign
aid, both military and economic.

He declared that the free

elections throughout Vietnam would not take place since
South Vietnam was not a party to the Geneva Conference.
Such elections could not be considered free unless all
Communist cadres were withdrawn from the north and impartial
United Nations• observers were on hand to supervise the
elections.
Vietnam.

These conditions were not acceptable to North
Diem's effective pacification of dissident

elements in South Vietnam, including the religious Cao Dai
sect and the French supported Binh Xuyen party, established
him in a strong position to- ~ounter North Vietnam influence.
facing this new power, Ho ..Chi Minh was forced to discontinue
1 7Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents
.2!! .,f1ternational Arfairs {London: The Chiswick Press, 1955),
p.

75.
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bis appeals for unity under the Communist leadership and

I

instead established an underground apparatus called the
VietnB.ITl Labour Youth League, a division of the Lao Dong
CoJllID.unist Party. 18 The United States' aid program in
south Vietnam was undertaken outside of its SEATO obligations, but not in conflict with them.

Other SEATO powers

made independent contributions as well, especially Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

The massive

United States aid program was seen not only as an effort
to save Vietnam alone, but "to deny to the Communists the
strategically and economically important area of Southeast
. ,,19
sia. ·

A

Internally, the Communist organization in all Vietnam
was seriously shaken by the Sino-Soviet ideological split

following the Hungarian uprising and the de-Stalinization
program undertaken by Khrushchev.

The uncertain situation

in the USSR and throughout the Communist movement after 1956
gave the Chinese an opportunity to exploit their strength
and prestige in Asia. 2
Chinese interest in the North

°

18

.

Brimmell, .22•

~.,

-

p. 300.

l9united States Congress, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Reeort of the Special Studz Mission to Southeast
~gat 88th ongres s--nlashington: Government 'Printing Office,
3J, p. 12.
P G. Bo~d, Communist Chin.a 's Forei~n Policy
(New York:· Frederick .A. Praeger, 1962), . p. 9.
20
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Vietnaillese became more active in late 1958.

Speaking

before the Fifth Session of the Peoples Congress in February
1958, Chou En-lai stated,
As one of the parties to the Geneva Agreement and a
close neighbor of the Indo-Chinese countries, China
is at all times concerned !1-th the consolidation of
peace in Indo-China • • • 2
More evidence of this competition for Party support by both
the Soviets and Chinese was the

stepped~up

tion ip Laotian affairs in late 1959.

Soviet participa-

This was followed by

substantial increases in aid to North Vietnam at the same
22
time.
It has been see.n that no direct intervention by SEATO
in this region was formally invited or undertaken, but
I

individual nations within SEA.TO did offer assistance in the
form of economic aid, medical

prograi~s,

schemes, and training programs.

military advisory

Since 1961 means have been

devised for associating South Vietnam in an observer status
with meetings of the SEATO Council and othar SEA,TO bodies.
Vietnamese officers have observed most of the SEATO mili·
tary exercises.

While falling short of full participation,

these new arrangements have made it possible for the
21center for International Affairs, Communis~ China
~$5•1959 Policy Documents (Cambridge: Harvard University
ess, 1962), p. 408.
·
22
Boyd, .Q.E.• ~., P• 54.
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Vietna...mese army staff to make contacts with the Military
Planning Office of SEATO at Bangkok.

This has permitted

at least some coordination of the individual foreign aid
projects without committing SEATO collectively in the
Vietnam war.

Without full participation, the North

Vietnamese feel conrident that ultimate victory will be
theirs.

Following an interview with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi

during July 1962, Barnard Fall stated:
The feeling of the Hanoi leadership seems to be
that a protracted revolutionary struggle in S.outh
Vietnam would fully discredit the south by the size
of the u • .s. commitment needed to keep it in power
and would permit, in the.ir words, " • • • the
marshalling of world t)ublic opinion against
American Imperialism.23
During the long years of fighting in South Vietnam,.
massive evidence and intelligence has been collected on the
origins, support, strategy, and ultimate goals of the Viet
Cong insurrection.

Much of this material collected by the

Security Branch of SEATO and the International Control
Commission indicates that the Communist regime in North
Vietnam, supplied by the Communist bloc throughout the world,
has assisted in the organization and direction of the
insurrection in South Vietnam.

Statements of North Vietnam's

leaders, captured documents and supplies, confessions of
2 3Be;nard B. Fall, ''The Road to Socialism in North
tietnam, 11 in Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategy in ~
New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), P• 213.
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captured agents, and other information secured through

sEATO and South Vietnamese 1ntelligence channels, would
str~ngthen

this charge.

The Communist leadership does not

deny this support and frequently exhorts the Party publically to stronger action and greater discipline.

For

example, Le Duan, a member or the Politburo and First

I

Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, said at the Party Congress
I

held in Hanoi in September 1960,
Parallel to the building and consolidation of
North Vietnam, bringing:it to Socialism, our people
should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam • • .24
Numerous speeches and statements of the North Vietnam
government leaders could be cited to show the nature of
their activities in South Vietnam.

A few of these are cited

to substantiate their open avowals to subversion.
in the party organ

Writing

!!.2.£ Tap in April 1961, Truong Chinh, one

of the principal leaders of the party in North Vietnam,
referred to Hanoi as the "revolutionary base common to the
entire country" and expressed confidence in the ability to
remove the present government of South Vietnam.

He added,

"North Vietnam is serving as a strong base for the struggle
for re-unification. " 2 5 North Vietnam's Defense Minister,

24SEATO Special Report, ~ 'Communist Plan .l,Q Conquer
~uth Vietnam (Bangkok: The Southeast Asia Treaty Organizat on, 1962), pp. 3.4.

25~.,

P•

4.
I
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General Vo Nguyen Giap, explicitly pointed out in !!2,g. Tap
in January 1960 that "the North has become a large rear
ech~lon

of our army • • • The North is the revolutionary

basa for the whole country."

26

Even earlier in 1959 the

party Congt"ess in Hanoi reaffirmed that:
common task of the Vietnamese revolution
is to • • • accelerate the socialist revolution
in North Vietnam ·while at the same time stepping
up the democratic revolution in South Vietnam
• • • • to maintain and develop these forces in
the South and create a r~xourable condition for
national re~unification. f
The

A very significant document on this subject is the report

of the International Control Commission, signed by India
and Canada (not by Poland) and released by the British
-

govermnent on June 25, 1962.

Tt stated that:

In -specific instances there is evidence to
show that arm~ d and unarmed personnel, arms,
m~nitions, and other supplies have been sent
from the zone in the North (Vietnam) to the zone
in the South with the object of supplying,
organizing, and carrying out hostile activities,
including armed attacks directed against the armed
forces and administration of the zone in the South.
These activities are in violation of Articles 10,
19, and
on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam
• • • .2

51

The use of sections of Laos as a base and inf'iltration route for the Viet Cong bas been an important factor
1n the movement of men and supplies from No.r th to South

Vietnam.

SEA.TO

Security organs have been aware ·of this

26 Ibid., P• 5.

2a12!,g.,

P• i1.

-

27Ibid.

I
I
I
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sfstem for several years.

In September 1961 there were

several major engageme·n t·s involving North Vietnamese Viet

Cons forces of 500 to 1000 men, in Kontum Province and

near Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands facing Laos,
as well as in Phuoc Thanh and Kien Phong along the Laos
border further to the south.

In this connection, Tchepone,

the town in eastern Laos to which Soviet transport planes
had been airlifting supplies in 1961, is only twenty miles

trom the Vietnamese border.

The airbase there has recently

been expanded and Tchepone is now believed to be a major
base of operations both for the Pathet Lao and the Viet
Cong. 29
In 1961 the Department of State issued a special

-

It described
Borth Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The
report entitled A Threat to the Peace.

evidence was collected by the Republic of South Vietnam
and presented .to the International Control Commission.

A

majority of the Commission agreed that there was sufficient
evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that North Vietnam
was guilty of organizing and supporting the insurrection in
South Vietnam in specific violations of rour provisions of
the Geneva Agreement of i954.30
29

..

~.,

p. 6.

R
30n~partment of State, ~ession From the North, the
-!Cor£ .2.£. North Vietnam's Campaign !.Q Con'Ci'iie'r SOUth Vietnam;

I
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Very recently the Department of State issued a
White Paper on the subject of Vietnam entitled Aggression

-

From the North,

~

Record of North Vietnam's

~ampaign

to

Conquer South Vietnam. Released in late February 1965, it
-was
timed to coincide with the United .S tates' increased
military involvement in Vietnam, particularly the airstrikes
against North Vietnam supply and staging centers used by the
Viet Cong.

The report is a summary of the massive evidence

of North Vietnamese aggression.

The evidence has been

jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.
It showed that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the

officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians,

the political organizers, and propagandists had come from
the North and operated under Hanoi's direction.

The train•

ing of essential military personnel and their ·infiltration
into the South was directed by the Military High Command
in Hanoi.3 1
The second section of this report gave evidence that

the weapons and munitions used by the Viet Cong came from
North Vietnam.

In recent months new types of weapons have

been introduced for which the ammunition had to come from
outside sources, namely Communist China and Eastern European
Communist bloc countries.32
lo. 7839 (Washington:
p. 2.

u. s.

Government Printing Office, 1965),

13.5
Section III of this report described the political
apparatus used through the Lao Dong to control and direct
operations against South Vietnam.

The Fourth section ex•

plained the military-political structures used by Hanoi
to rurther the Viet Cong war.

Each of these sections of

the report presented a mass of documentary evidence, many

including photographs, and the findings of the International
Control Commission are likewise produced as evidence.

Under

the heading of military infiltration, the report cites the
following example.

Special training camps are operated in

Xuan Mai and Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam.

Trained personnel

are then infiltrated to the South by the 70th Transport
Group which uses trails via Laos as well as the maritime
route along the coast.

A typical case was Major Tran Quoc

Dan, formerly with the Vietminh Army against the French,
who, after the Geneva Agreement was sent to Hanoi to join
the new Peoples A:rmy.

In March of 1962 he received orders

to move to South Vietnam.

With six hundred men. he traveled

through the Laos corridor and joined the First Viet Cong
Regiment in South Vietnam.

He subsequently took part in

forty-five actions against the South Vietnam army before
defecting.33
Covering the logistic field, the report cites many
cases of Czechoslovak and East German arms being captured.

33

.

!!2.!!!·' p. 21.

136
on February 16, 1965 an American helicopter pilot sighted
a suspicious vessel offshore of Phu Yen Province.

A

Vietnamese airforce strike against the vessel sank it and
a short time later the cargo was retrieved.

It contained

one hundred tons of assorted weapons and ammunition,
including two thousand Mauser rifles, light machine guns,
anti-tank

75

mm recoilless weapons of Chinese manufacture,

one million rounds of small arms ammunition, medical supplies, and other field equipment.

A member of the Inter•

national Control Commission and members of the .free press
were present to examine the cargo and ship which had sailed
out of Haiphong just a few days before.34
This Department of State document along with the
reports of the International Control Commission give conclusive proof that North Vietnam is guilty of aggressive
actions against the government of South Vietnam and consequently endanger the peace of the Manila Treaty area.
SEATO intelligence reports based on the findings of the
Organization's Security Branch confirm the reports submitted
by the government of South Vietnam and a majority of the

International Control Commission.

On the basis of these

diversified reports, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
is faced with a real and ppesent challenge to its purpose
and authority in the Treaty area.

CQiNCLUSION
Since the Un ited States had n.o S'on·tl:i k s:i?a'0.1. colon ial
territories under administrative cont.r ol af'ter the inde•
pendence of the Philippin es, her i n terest and participation
in the Manila Conference was made less suspect than that of
Britain or France.
as colonial powers.

The latter nations at the time continued
An essential element of American

prewar p oli cy was the Open Door in Asia, and this policy
appears to have been important in prompting the United
States to support the creationof SEATO.

While this no

longer took the form of special privileges or extraterritorial rights, American policy sought to continue free
access to the vital raw materials of this region and
unfettered trade through the friendly cooperation of the
governments of Asia.

American policy was prompted as well

by the desire to contain Communism within its immediate

bounds.

The United States expressed concern in early 1946

that the Soviet Unionts implementation of the Yalta Agreement in the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur had
denied free and open access of these ports to other powers
and improperly removed Chinese political authority over
these cities.

In December 1946, the writer accompanied a

United States n aval vessel to the port of Dairen which
challenged the Soviet position and this resulted in the

138
so-called "Dairen Incident" of 1946.

1

While the United

states government responded to a Russian ultimatum to leave
the harbor within twenty-four hours or bear full responsibility for the safety of the vessel, the incident did serve
to focus attention on Russian violations of the Yalta
Agreement and the Open Door doctrine.
When the formation of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Pact was announced, the Communist and neutralist
denunciation which followed took very similar form.

The

Warsaw Pact powers considered the presence of a military
defense bloc in the East a threat to the balance of power,
but their hostility did not approach that of the Chinese.
They looked upon SEATO as a subt'e rfuge to undermine the

Communist achievements at the Geneva Conference table.
These powers complained that the alliance was intended to
be a cover for the return of 'Western imperialism to carry
out further exploitation of the people of Asia and to "grab
up the natural riches of these countries." 2
The Russians were quick to point out that Asian
participation in the Treaty represented a small minority and
consequently it could not be regarded as a Southeast Asian

1New York Times, December 24, 1946.
2 i'Declaration of the 'Warsaw Treaty States," The
~urrent Digest Q.f, the Soviet Press, (July, 1958), .X:2o.
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pact.

The next step, according to the Soviet Union, would

be an effort by these same Western powers to conclude an
aggressive alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and a
re-militarized Japan which could eventually be merged with

SEAT0.3 This would not only make the Western position more
palatable to the Asian members but would provide a cheap
Khrushchev in early 1958 pro-

source of manpower as well.

tested against all these military blocs as a cause of war
rather than a means of defense, and reminded the world that
the Socialist camp would be willing to dismantle its alliances if the West would do likewise.4

A recent article in

Pravda criticized American retaliation against North Vietnam
in the following terms:
In an attempt to create at least a semblance
of a pretext for these new acts of armed aggression
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, u. s.
officials could refer to the fact that in the
course of their liberation struggle, the South
Vietnamese patriots are dealing blows at military
installations on the territory of the u. s.
occupied South Vietnam. But who gave the United
States the right to retaliate against the actions
of guerillas in South Vietnam • • • thereby helping a puppet government in South Vietnam.5

3M. Markov, ''SEA.TO' s Future and the NEATO Project,"
_!nternational Affairs (Moscow: June,1962), · 6:61.
.

4Mik.h.ail Kremenyev, "The Non-align~d Countries and
World Politics," World Marxist Review, Vol. VI (April,

1963), 28.

'

' ''

'

'

5Pravda Editorial, Soviet Documents, Vol. III,

No. 9 (Marc~ 1965), 7.
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The reaction of India and Indonesia was similar to
that of the Soviet Union.

was that SEATO

i~self

The
substance of their complaint
.
..

was an instrument or potential aggres•

sion dominated by the West9rn powers and was actually Western
colonialism in a new form. 6 Nehru objected that SEATO gave
the West a hand in Asian affairs and was not only directed

against Communism, but against all non-member nations as
well. 7
In studying Indonesian resistance to the SEA.TO alli•
ance, two very important political factors must be considered.
First, the political fabric and philosophy of the present
day Indonesian government has been closely sympathetic with
the Connnunist bloc and the largest supporting element of
the Sukarno leadership has been the Indonesian Communist
Party.

SecoDd, if Indonesia had become one of the Treaty's

signatory powers, it is unlikely that her own expansive
geographical ambitions could have been attempted or realized.
Sukarno had this to say as early as 1945:
I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a
Pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya
and Papua (New Guinea) but all the Philippines •• • •
6Ralph Briabanti, International Implications 2f. ~
laniJ:.! ~ (New York~ American Institute of Pacific
.
elations, 1957), p. 37.
· 7Hamilto~ Fish Armstrong, ''Thoughts Along the China
Border," Foreign Affairs (January, . 1960), 265.

,
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I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya
feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to
Indonesia and as one of us • • • I still say
• • • that Indonesia will not become strong and
secure unl~ss the whole Straits of Malacca is in
our hands.
Sukarno was not inhibited in his militant approach to the
West Irian problem nor in his recent threats to destroy
Malaysia.

His encouragement to subversive elements and his

organized guerilla attacks against this neighbor in recent
I

months are common knowledge.

ii

The Peoples Republic of China not only took a strong

I

position against the Manila Treaty but also brought con•
siderable pressure to bear against the small states of
Southeast Asia to avoid their alignment with the Manila
Treaty powers.

Chou

En~lai,

the Foreign Minister,

declared to the Peoples Congress in September

1954

I

that

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was set up to undermine the

1954

Geneva Agreement and to give the United

States an opportunity to suppress national movements in the
area.

It further permitted the United States, under the

guise of foreign aid to "strip these countries of their raw
materials and enslave the peoples with a return to colonial
rule. 11 9

Chou also warned ·that through the use of the

8 nThe Terri to.r y of the Indonesian State," Background
~ Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur:
alayasian Government, . 1964), p~ 2o.

9Brimmell,

2:2• ..Qi-1., P•

288.

I
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"designat~d"

states, United States imperialism would be

I
·

1

able to extend its armed intervention and oppression to
other parts of Asia.

A returned Thai visitor to Peking in

1957 reported after his interview with Mao Tse-tung, that
china considered the SEA.TO structure a false wall made with
faulty bricks, and like the Baghdad Pact, could not hold
up. 10
The states which came under the protection of the
Treaty by designation took different views.

Both Cambodia

and Laos during the late 1950s welcomed the political
stability that SEA.TO encouraged, especially in regard to
the peaceful handling of long smoldering border disputes.
But late in 1962, after the Geneva settlement on Laos,
both nations asked to be released from the "designated"
category in order to remain entirely neutral and non-aligned
so far as relations with Communist China were concerned.
However, soon after the cease fire in Laos in 1962 the
agreement had been repeatedly broken by the Communist Pathet
Lao, and the International Control Commission stated that it
had been impeded in carrying out its function by the opposition of the Communists.

Consequently, there has been little

lOnavid .Wilson, "China, Thailand, and the Spirit
of Bandung," ~ ~ Corporation (July, 1962), 28.
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progress towards national reunification. 11
The insurgency against the government of South
Vietnam reflects a very complicated situation containing
strong political factors as well as military.

The postwar

policy to contain Communism had its origins in Europe.

Here

nations faced the military threat of the Red Army marching
against the West.

A

line was drawn, beyond which Soviet

power could not prevail without battle.

But in the Far

East, and especially Vietnam, the nature of the threat is
12 W - l r
•
•1 y mi•1•t
not pr1mar1
1 ary b u t po l"t"
1 ica1 •
e(UI.. and corrup t
government in South Vietnam has been an easy target for
Communist reaction and subversion.

Despite all the

features the world dislikes about Communism, it has adroitly
recognized and exploited historical forces working in its
favor, while the attractions of Western political democracy
1
have not aroused any mass acceptance. 3 South Vietnam bas
continued under SEATO protection as a designated powe.r and
this question was the subject of heated debate during the
recent meeting of the members at Manila in April 1964.

The

liunited States Congress, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Report of the Special S.tudy Mission to Southeast
Asia October 1963, 88th Congress Report #893 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 15.
12Ha.ns J. Morgenthau, "We are Deluding Ourselves in
Vietnam," ~ X2!:1f Times Magazin~, April 18, 1965, p. 25.
13sidney Len~, The Futile Crusade (Chicago:
Books, 1964), p. 40.

Quadrangle

Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman sounded out the signatory powers on the possibility of direct SEA.TO assistance
in the long struggle against the Viet•Cong, should South
Vietnam make such a request.

While only France vetoed

discussion of the proposal, and this was not unexpected in
view of the diminished French interest in the area, some
of the other Treaty nations have been reluctant to enter
this situation without a clearer demonstration of political
stability ih the south.
A proper evaluation of SEA.T0 1 s role in Southeast
Asia must take into account two important and continuing
factors.

The first is the militant and expansive nature

of international Communism with its professed doctrine to
eradicate, ultimately, all forms of non•sacialist political
economies throughout the world.

The second is the historical

pattern of Chinese pressure for hegemony over Southeast Asia
based on Chinese security considerations and the material
requirements to support China's exploding population.
These patterns have not changed.

To say that China has

always been well placed to overrun her neighbors, but has
not been inclined to do so, fails to admit the long periods

or

Chinese suzerainty over the "tribute" states.

Further-

more, the advent of European colonialism in this area with
its techniques of modern warfare and the competitive demands

or

Imperial Japanese policy temporarily inhibited Chinese

ambitions in Southeast Asia.
With the removal of both Japanese and European
colonial status in most parts of Southeast Asia following
world War II, the focus of 'C hinese interest on the area
resumed new vigor and purpose, especially after the victory
of the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949.

While the more

obvious component of this interest bas been Chinese economic
penetration, a greater concern to the people of

~sia

has

been China's aid to Communist insurgent organizations.

The 1

overseas Chinese problem has been a serious one to these
small countries and became more so when Communist China
decided in 1953 to provide places for thirty representatives
of the Overseas Chinese in the National Peoples Congress in
Peking. 1 4 This representation emphasized the effort at
central con.t rol maintained by the Peoples Government of
China over its brethren in Southeast Asia.

These countries

have also been alarmed by Communist China's continued
adherence to the traditional j!!§ sanguinis doctrine which,
in contrast to the more generally accepted Jus .!Q!!, regards
ancestry and not birthplace as the criteria of nationality
and furthermore permits no renunciation of the former.

The

Secretary-General of SEATO stated that where the Communist
Party is legally forbidden, it has been able to f'unction

14Barnett, ,,2,,£• £.!:!:,., P• 190.

through various Chinese front organizations, secret socie•
ties, and even Chambers of Commerce. 1 5 The governments of
southeast Asia openly challenged this dual policy during
the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, and
while the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou

En~lai

expressed

willingness to compromise this issue with Indonesia at
that time, no comparable arrangement has been made with any

ot the other Southeast Asian states.

In fact, even in

Indonesia the Chinese have been very reluctant to accept
the change,and as a double insurance have elected to have

one member of a family assume Indonesian citizenship while
another would maintain his Chinese nationality. 16

Many

regarded this as an implied possibility among the overseas
Chinese of some form of future take-over by the Communists.
To most of these Chinese blood bas always proved thicker
than economics, geography, or ideology.

The writer was

constantly reminded of this fact during his residence in
Thailand, and especially after the Communist victory in
China in 1949.
Here, then, exists a situation similar to that found
in prewar Europe where German communities outside the Reich
1.5oepartment of State, Bulletin, "Report on SEA.TO,"
Vol. XL, No. 1035 (Washington: u.
Government Printing
Office, April, 1959), P• 607.

s.

16

Barnett,

.Q.E.• ~.,

P• 325.
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(as in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland) were clearly organized
and manipulated to the Nazi's advantage in undermining the
integrity of these smaller border states. 1 7

But where

Germany had to face the sturdy nationalism of the non-German
elements in these countries, China can depend on the support
of most of the non-Chinese who have espoused the international concept of world Communism and whose loyalties
are doctrinal rather than national.

Here China would appear

to control two "fifth" columns, one ethnic and the other
ideological.

In the countries of Southeast Asia, these

elements could be emploJ.ed in varying degrees, depending
upon the overseas Chinese content of the area.

In Malaya,

for example, with a large Chinese minority but small
Communist element, the ethnic control would be emphasized,
while in Indonesia with a relatively small Chinese community,
ideological ties would predominate.
China has used these minorities within the Treaty
area and has supported or participated with these Communist
groups effectively in a long series of uprisings and insurgencies since the end of World War II.

A list of these

would include the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the
Malaya Insurgency, the Communist uprisings,in Burma among
the Karen and Kachin tribes, the coup d'etat attempted by

17charl~s A.. Fisher, "The Chinese Threat to Southeast
Asia," ~Central Asian Journal, LI, 3 & 4, London
(July, 1964), 262 • .

Pridi Panamyong in Thailand, the military conquest of Tibet,
the Kerala autonomous movement in India, the Korean War,
the Viet-cong insurgency in South Vietnam, and the invasion
of India in 1962.
The overt Chinese aggression against a neighbor as in
Tibet in 1951 could be likened to Germany's annexation of
territories on he.r borders in the 1930 1 s which resulted in
an intimidation and sense of defeatism among the small
states following these adventures.

Likewise the military

ineffectiveness of India against open Chinese attack and
invasion in 1962 has tended to produce similar reactions
in Southeast Asia, with significant shifts in policy within
Cambodia a.n.d Burma and the accelerated crumbling of resistance in Laos and South Vietnam.

Aside from the latent

and implied deterrent effect of American nuclear capacity,
no effective check on Chinese Communist expansion, other
than: world opinion, existed until the organization of the
Manila Treaty powers. 18
The reason for fearing Chinese interest in this area
is that Southeast Asia is one of the richest of all the
world's tropical regions and as such has attracted invaders,
both military and economic, continuously during the last 1000
years.

The lure of this tropical abundance set off the whole
18 Ibid., p. 260.

-

process of worldwide co1onialism in this area. Although the
earliest activities were confined merely to gaining control
over these resources, more advanced forms of colonialism
required guarantees of political stability and security to
protect investments.

The departure of European control and

the totalitarian organization of' the Japanese occupation
at the end of World War II left not only a power vacuum but
an administrative one as well.

This was reflected in the

long postwar disorganization of the economies of the small
states of Asia.

During the war India saw itself as a

potential substitute for both Japanese and European influence in this area.

Thus writing in 1943, K. M. Panikkar

stated that in most respects,
the economy of India and Southeast Asia can be
considered as being complementary. Therefore,
if a satisfactory economy is to develop in this
area after the war, it can only be if India and
Southeast Asia work out a •co-Prosperity Sphere'
based on their inter~dependence.19
With Japan, India then was the third great overpopulated state to eye the abundance of Southeast Asia as
a solution to its food and raw material problems.

India

aimed at a good neighbor policy toward Asia, based on
mutual trust, self help, and the other tenets of Panche
Sila, and for a period it appeared that this relationship
was indeed beginning to grow.

19

.
Fisher, .Q.E.•

£1!.,

The Columbo Plan itself

p. 262.

embodied these hopes and it is very likely for this reason
that India took a strong position against Columbo Plan
participation in SEA.TO, regarding it as a splintering
influence of her own p.r estige in the region.

But India's
II

failure to complete her own ambitious plans for industrialization and her inability to meet Japanese competition
in the area by 1960, reduced her claim as a serious leader
in the economic organization of

Asia~

The pressing need for food and raw materials has been
a strong incentive for China to organize its own co-prosperity sphere.

20

Geographical factors seriously restrict

her ability to increase the necessary agricultural production for minimal needs, but this nation does not lack
the manpower to obtain these needs by force if necessary.
Thus, the ambitions of Communist China in Southeast Asia
can be easily understood, and likewise the fears of the
people in this region for such ambitions.
The value of SEA.TO is best measured by its implied
function as a psychological deterrent to massive attack and
Connnunist subversion.

However, the military and technical

capabilities of the Treaty powers, organized and directed
by SEA.TO, ultimately determine the effectiveness of this

deterrent.

Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the full
I

. 1

I

20~. ·

1

11

I
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11

value of this defense organization and its presence in
southeast Asia.

It is also impossible to state that SEATO

has prevented a more aggressive Communist policy in Asia
in the last decade.

But, since the Manila Treaty came into

effect in 1954, there has been no major assault or open
attack against any of the Treaty powers similar to that
witnessed in India in 1962.
deterrent.

SEATO may well have been a

The settlement of the Laotian problem has not

called for formal intervention of SEA.TO.

I,

Nor has there

been a fo.r mal declaration by South Vietnam to seek Treaty
protection as a designated state during the present Vietcong insurgency.

But, individual members of the organization
I

have not been prevented from taking independent action in
support of the South Vietnam government.

1

SEA.TO withstood

much maligning because of its inaction during the Laotian
crises.

The lack of unanimity and cohesion on the political

level during this crisis in 1961 and 1962, led many to
believe that the alliance had lost its meaning.

Even today

SEA.TO's caution in the South Vietnam crisis has aroused
criticism and even some joshing on the part of the Communist
leadership.

But by refusing to act precipitately, it may

have avoided springing a Communist trap.

By keeping the

military strength of the alliance in the baekground during
the crucial political developments in Laos, the Treaty powers
were able to gain time to bolster the faltering Laotian

I

1

I

I.

government by political means.

In many Asian eyes, this

raised the stature of the organization, especially among
those who feared that hasty and precipitous military
judgement might prevail and plunge all Asia in war.21
Mao-Tse•tung has compared SEA.TO 'to a faulty wall
which will crumble under its own weight.

Even so,

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has pointed out that frequent
Chinese propaganda attacks and demonstrations against the
organization would suggest a high regard and concern for this
so-called "paper tiger. 1122 Former Ambassador to South
Vietnam, Frederick Reinhardt believes that such hostility
to the Treaty implies that SEATO's presence has interrupted

.

Communist designs on this region.

23

Consequently, until

the fear of Communist aggression is removed, these Treaty
nations of Southeast Asia seem inclined to support Western
participation in their collective defense and regard the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the better alternative
to a possible forced accommodation with Peking.
2 1 Norman J. Padelford, "SEATO and Peace in Southeast
Asia,'' Current History (February, 1960), 38:95 •
. 2 2nean Rusk, "Seventh Annivers~y of SEATO,"
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1161, p. 528.
23G. Frederick R~in~dt, "What SEATO Means to the
United States," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL,
No. 1030, P• 397.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY*
The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognising the sovereign equality of all the
Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and princi~
ples set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and
their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal
rights and selfedetermination of peoples, and declaring
that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to
promote self egovernment and to secure the independence of
all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to
undertake its responsibilities,
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and
freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the
economic wellebeing and development of all peoples in the
Treaty area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their
sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will
appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area,
and
Desiring further to co...ordinate their efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security,
'Illerefore agree as follows: ~

ARTICLE I
'lbe Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes
in which they may be 1nvolved by peaceful means in such
manner that international peace and security and justice
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 795,
September 20, 1954.
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ARTICLE II
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives
of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by
means of continuous and effective self ~help and mutual aid
will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter
subversive activities directed from without against their
territorial integrity and political stability.

I:

ARTICLE III
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free
institutions and to co...operate with one another in the
further development of economic measures, including
technical assistance, designed both to promote economic
progress and social well-being and to further the indivi~
dual and collective efforts of Governments toward these
ends.
ARTICLE IV
l. Each Party recognises that aggression by means
of anned attack in the treaty area against any of the
Parties or against any state or territory which the Parties
by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would
endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will
in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under
this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council of the United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the
sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the
treaty area or of any other State or territory to which
the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time
to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed
attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the
Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the
measures which should be taken except at the invitation or
with the consent of the Government concerued.
3. It is understood that no action on the territory
of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated
shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent
of the Government concerned.

Ii'
I
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ARTICLE V
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which
each of them shall be represented, to consider matters
concerning the implementation of this Treaty. '1he Council
shall provide for consultation with regard to military and
any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty
area may from time to time require. '!he Council shall be
so organised as to be able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obliga~
tions of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security. Each Party declares that none of the international
engagements now in force between it and any other of the
Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions
of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE VII
Any other State in a position to further the
objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security
of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be
invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited
may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Goverrunent of the Republic of
the Philippines. '!he Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit
of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE VIII
As used in this Treaty, the 'treaty area' is the
general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire
territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of
the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north
of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may,
by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include
within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding
to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise
to change the treaty area.

I
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ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly
certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the
Government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respec ....
tive constitutional processes. The instruments of
ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which
shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.
·3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the
States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments
of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall
have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect
to each other State on the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification.
ARTICLE X
'lb.is Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but
any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the
Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each
notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the
Parties, but when the parties have agreed to the French
text thereof and have so notified the Goverrunent of the
Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be
equally authentic and binding on the Parties.
UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the
present Treaty does so with the understanding that its
recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack
and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV,
paragraph 1, apply only to Communi~t aggression, but . a~firms
that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it
will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have signed this Treaty.
Done at l'1anila, this eighth day of September, 1954.
(Signatures)

II
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PRO'roCOL
DESIGNATION OF THE STATES AND TERRI TORY AS TO
WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND
ARTICLE III .ARE 'ro BE APPLICABLE .
The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty unanimously designate for the purpose of Article IV
of the Treaty and the States of Cambodia and Laos and the
free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet"
Nam.
The Parties further agree that the above mentioned
states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the
economic measures contemplated by Article III.
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously
with the coming into force of the Treaty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have signed . this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty.

I
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PACIFIC CHARTER

1

The Delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand,

PThaak~ stand, theh.e URe~ubldiKic.ofdthe Pfhilippine~, ~he Kid·ngdom of
i
an , t
m.te
ng om o Great Britain an Nort1ern
1

Ireland, and the United States of America,
Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action
to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific,
Convinced that common action to this end, in order
to be worthy and effective, must by inspired by the highest
principles of justice and liberty,
Do Hereby Proclaim:
First, in accordance with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter 1 they uphold the principle of equal
rights and self~determination of peoples and they will
earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote selfgovernment and to secure the independence of all countries
whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its
responsibilities;
Second, they are each prepared to continue taking
effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable
to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in
accordance with their constitutional processes;
Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic,
social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living
standards, economic progress and social well-being in this
region;

I
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Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia C.Ollective
Defense Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter
by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to
subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or
territorial integrity.
Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September,
1954.

I
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APPENDIX B
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES*

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in
the Pacific Area,
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship
which brought their two peoples together in a common bond
of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side ...by-side again.st
imperialist aggression during the last war,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense
of unity and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone
in the Pacific Area,
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts
for collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument
shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense
altering or diminishing any existing agreements or under~
standings between the United States of .America and the
Republic of the Philippines,
Have agreed as follows:ARTICLE I

'lbe Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice
are not endangered and to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*U. s. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations,
Treat{ Provisions Relati2' to Use of u. s. Forces for
Mutua Defense, October 2 , L9~ p. 22. -
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ARTICLE II
In order more effectively to achieve the objective
of this . Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by
self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III
Tile Parties through their Foreign ~ti.nisters or
their deputies 1 will consult together from time to time
regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever
in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of either of the Parties
is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act
to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a
result thereof shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations. Su.ch measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.
ARTICLE V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on
either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack
on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the
Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the
United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations
for the maintenance of international peace_ and security.

I/
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ARTICLE VII
-

.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States
of .America and the Repµblic of the Philippines in accord~
ance with their respective constitutional processes and
will come into force when instruments of ratification
thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.
ARTICLE VIII
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.
Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has
been given to the other Party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth
day of August 1951.
(Here follow the signatures)

I
I
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APPENDIX C
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND,
AND THE UNITED STATES OF . AMERICA
('ANZUS' . TREATY)*
'Ille Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Govern~
ments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace
in the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has
arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are
stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and
administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon
the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may
also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist
in the preservation of peace and security int he Japan
Area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have mili"
tary obligations outside as well as within the Pacific
Area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their
sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor oould be
under the illusion that any of them stan d alone in the
Pacific Area! and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and
security pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Tilerefore declare and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations, to settle any intern~tional dis~
putes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in a ny
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

*U. S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations,
Treatt Provisions Relatin; to ~6e of u. s. Forces for
Mutua Defense, October 2 , L9 · , p. !:53:-
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ARTICEE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective
of this . Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid will maintain and develop their individual and col~
lective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III
"

.

"

The Parties will consult together whenever in the
opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a
result thereof shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on
any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack
on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or"
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the
Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI
'Ihis Treaty does not affect and shall not be
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the
United Nations or the responsibility of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security.

I
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ARTICLE VII
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting
of their Foreign ¥dnisters of their Deputies, to consider
matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The
Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at
any time.

ARTICLE VIII
Pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the
development by the United Nations of more effective means
to maintain international peace and security, t'ffi Council,
established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a
consultative relationship .with States, Regional Organiza~
tions, Associations of States or other authorities in th~
Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Area.
ARTICLE IX
nrls Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as
soon as possible with the Govermnent of Australia, which
will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit.
'!he Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifica~
tions of the signatories have been deposited.
ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.
Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council estab~
lished by Article VII one year after notice has been
given to the Govermnent of Australia, which will inform
the Governments of th.e other Parties of the deposit of
such notice.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty in the English language shall be
deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia.

165
Duly cert~fied copies thereof will be transmitted by that
Government to the Governments of each ,of the other
signatories.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have signed this Treaty.
Done at the City of San Francisco this first day of
September, 1951.
(Signatures)
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